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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I will examine some of the economic and management issues which must be
addressed if Space Station is to effectively and efficiently pursue the myriad goals that have been 
chosen for it. I will characterize and evaluate in a somewhat stylized fashion three possible policies: an 
"engineering" approach, an "economics" approach, and a systematic custom design approach. I will use 
Space Station as an example to highlight some of the major economic issues facing large scale 
multipurpose research and development efforts, the analytical capabilities we now have to address these 
issues, and the (non-engineering) research that needs to be done to advance the successful long-term 
development of space. 
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I. PROLOGUE 
Space exploration and development are naturally conducted on the cutting edge of science and 
technology. Such efforts inevitably involve decisions made in the presence of extensive uncertainty. 
For some projects, particularly those which involve the creation and maintenance of an infrastructure, 
the emphasis is switching from specific engineering goals (a man on the moon by 1969) to more diffuse, 
continuing, multiple-dimensional goals. This is especially true of the Space Station which is envisioned 
as both a vital link in the exploration of the planets and a major facility for the advancement of 
commercial efforts in space. The combination of uncertainty and diffuse, long-term goals 
fundamentally alters the viability and validity of traditional economic and engineering approaches to the 
management of large public research and development projects. 
It has become popular to call into question the recent management of continuing projects like 
the Space Transportation System or major new weapons systems. We must, however, recognize that 
cost overruns, gold plating and other forms of apparent mismanagement are usually not the result of 
individual venality and misbehavior but only the natural outcomes of the existing organizational rules of 
the game. Just as the performance of an engineering design is guided by the laws of physics, the 
performance of an organizational design is guided by the laws of behavior. This simple fact means that 
to improve performance one cannot simply add more or better manpower, one must look for new 
organizational solutions. There are many ad hoc opinions about how to do this; what I propose is a 
more systematic, scientific approach. 
In this paper I will examine some of the economic and management issues which must be 
addressed if Space Station is to effectively and efficiently pursue the myriad goals that have been 
chosen for it. I will characterize and evaluate in a somewhat stylized fashion three possible policies: an 
"engineering" approach, an "economics" approach, and a systematic custom design approach. I will use 
Space Station as an example to highlight some of the major economic issues facing large scale 
multipurpose research and development efforts, the analytical capabilities we now have to address these 
issues, and the (non-engineering) research that needs to be done to advance the successful long-term 
development of space. 
Space Station is a prototype for future joint endeavors of the private and public sector. It is 
imperative that we learn how to organize and manage these projects optimally so that our efforts in 
space are truly productive. Since inefficiencies cumulate, gains in organizational performance today 
have multiplicative effects into the future. Inefficiencies in the design, construction and operation of the 
STS and its orbiters will cause higher costs of access to the Space Station and other low earth orbiting 
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facilities. These higher access costs will cause the costs of operation of Space Station to be higher even 
if it is efficiently managed. If, as is more likely, Space Station is inefficiently designed, built, and 
operated, then the costs of design, building and operation of higher orbit space ports will be even higher 
than anticipated. This cumulative process will never cease with inefficiencies compounding at each 
stage in the process. Each step actually taken will be smaller than optimal because required budgets for 
the planned step will be larger than predicted. As in Zeno's Paradox when each step is a fixed fraction 
of the previous one, we may never get where we want to go unless we can adjust the step size using 
organizational solutions that eliminate inefficiencies. Exciting visions of the next fifty years in space 
that ignore these organizational realities are doomed to failure. The nation's organizational vision must 
begin to match its scientific and engineering vision. 
II. INTRODUCTION
In this background section, I first summarize some of the economically important characteristics 
of the Space Station. Second, I introduce the language and structure of mechanism design theory and 
practice, since many may be unfamiliar with this recently developed, powerful approach to resource 
allocation problems. 
A. An Introduction to the Space Station 
Space Station is described by NASA as a multi-use, permanent facility in low-earth orbit that 
will significantly enhance space utilization. It is to be a laboratory (enabling scientific research, 
technology development, and manufacturing research), an observatory, a transportation node, a 
servicing facility with assembly capabilities, a storage depot, and a staging base for future missions. An 
economist's superficial view might be that Space Station is simply a commercial development project 
and research complex with a special location. (NASA planning seems to emphasize the research 
complex while some in Congress and the private sector try to emphasize the commercial aspects.) An 
engineer's superficial view might be that Space Station is simply a few modules (large cans similar to 
SpaceLabs and designed to fit exactly into a shuttle bay) fastened together on a frame and provided with 
local facilities to produce some needed services such as power. Space Station is obviously more 
complex than either of these views would suggest. Space Station is economically different from many 
other projects to which one might be tempted to compare it. A naive person might equate Space Station 
to a public utility (electric power or telephone service, a major road, a dam), to a major weapons system, 
to the Apollo missions, or to the Shuttle and its combined Space Transportation System (STS). Space 
Station does share important characteristics with each of these but it is identical to none. While Space 
Station does have the large set-up costs and large common operating costs of public utilities, its 
technology, costs and benefits are vastly more uncertain. While Space Station does promise to provide 
large public (nonparticipant) benefits and major technology advances like Apollo, its goals, missions 
and performance requirements are less certain and more diverse. Space Station is distinguished from 
the Shuttle because it offers a multidimensional product to multiple, overlapping, continuous, and 
potentially long-term users. 
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1. Key Economic Characteristics
There are several economic characteristics of Space Station that are important to keep in mind. 
It is a multi-use facility designed to supply a multidimensional vector of resources over time to a
diverse collection of users whose needs will change in unpredictable ways. It is not a single-goal 
project; it will need to be continuously managed after it is built. 
Associated with Space Station are large common costs, costs which cannot be identified as 
having been incurred solely for the provision of one resource (a standard example is communal 
computer facilities), and large public benefits, benefits simultaneously provided to many individuals at 
one time in a way that one individual's consumption does not detract from any other individual's 
consumption (an example is the services of defense). One implication of this observation is that 
efficient private provision of this first facility is not feasible; Space Station should be partially publicly 
funded. 
The benefits to be achieved by the users, both the scientific community and the commercial 
sector, over the life cycle of the Space Station are very uncertain and may be unknowable today but may 
be eventually discoverable. What is known about the extent of the benefits as well as the composition 
of the missions that will yield those benefits will change over time. But a deeper problem exists. Not 
only are the benefits uncertain, those individuals and organizations with the most incentive to evaluate 
and estimate them, such as potential users, have little incentive to reveal that information correctly and 
inform public debate. If information can aid competitors it must be protected. If user charges for Space 
Station's resources may depend on the benefit information supplied, there is a strong incentive to 
understate the true benefits; if the allocation of resources and not the charges for their use depends on 
user responses, there is an incentive to overstate the potential benefits. Since, at this time, users have no 
idea how the information they supply is to be used, they protect themselves by both overstating and 
understating the benefits. When asked what the potential for commercial development of space is, the 
answer is often "billions and billions of dollars"; however, when pressed for payment these same 
repondents indicate that the risks are really great, that it is possible that no benefits will occur, and that 
unless someone (usually the public sector) helps them they will be unable to participate. Thus different 
aspects of their probability beliefs will be presented depending on the predicted use of that information. 
The benefits to be achieved by the public are even more difficult to discover. Research has 
shown that public polls and user surveys are unreliable. We do have a preliminary, indirect measure. 
Congress, representing the public, has indicated a willingness to pay of at least $8 billion plus some 
unspecified amount for operating costs in return for the benefits that the public will receive. Assuming 
that public preferences are transmitted through the political system, Congressional willingness to pay 
supplies a lower bound on possible public benefits. Of course, as with the private sector, Congressmen 
and their constituents also have incentives to conceal or misrepresent information they may have, 
causing the political process to be an imperfect aggregator of benefit information. 
The costs of building and operating Space Station are very uncertain. Various cost "models" 
generate point estimates from scanty data sets by extending and aggregating regressions, of cost upon 
weight, up to scales which raise doubts about the implicit linearity assumptions. An economist is
immediately reminded of large scale econometric forecasting models when he sees one of these cost 
models. I presume that the inaccuracy of each is somewhat equivalent and that when the predictions of 
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the model conflict with the hunches of the analyst, the model loses and is changed. It will not be until 
the new technology is tested and operational that one will know actual costs with any certainty. Even 
then there is no reason to believe that these observed costs will be the minimum costs possible (see 
Quirk and Terasawa [1984]). (A historical examination of the estimates of development and operations 
costs for the shuttle and a comparison of those estimates to the actual costs should be a sobering 
experience for anyone who wishes to make major policy decisions based on point estimates.) Since 
nothing like Space Station exists, one cannot examine a surrogate and ask what should the Space Station 
cost; one can only make educated guesses about ranges. Further, as with the benefits, those who may 
have the better information, such as potential contractors, builders and operators of the Space Station, 
have little incentive to share their knowledge. (It is possible that this is overly pessimistic for the 
aerospace industry. In repeated situations with long term relationships between the contractor and the 
contractee, it is sometimes in the interests of each party to reveal correctly and early.)
Even if the cost models of the Space Station components were accurate and information was 
fully shared, a deeper problem exists when building a large, interactive system that involves new 
technologies (or old technologies at new scales). Given any design of the gross characteristics of the 
Station, there is still uncertainty about the net resources that will be available for the users. There is a 
complicated input-output relationship, with extensive feedback effects, among various Station resources 
(e.g., power, extra-vehicular activity, heat rejection, etc.) and there are uncertainties as to how much of 
one of these resources will be needed to support the provision of another. These uncertainties interact in 
a complicated manner to create a range of possible performance, a probability density over net resource 
availabilities. For example, power is to be both available to users and needed for the internal operation 
or housekeeping of the Space Station. As in land based electric power generation and distribution and 
in the STS, service is interruptible. The extent and impact of these uncertain curtailments must be 
planned for in any sensible policy analysis: point estimates are misleading and ignore the realities. 
To illustrate the importance of supply reliability and the increased decision burden it places on 
Space Station operations let me walk through an extended example; If a planned shuttle trip is delayed, 
what can happen? If astronaut survival has the highest priority, payloads may be bumped from the 
shuttle to make room for extra provisions for the crew (astronauts and payload specialists). Supplies 
already on station may be diverted from the labs towards manpower. Finally, manpower effort 
available for both the payloads and the station may be reduced to conserve on resources needed for 
survival. This will increase the probability of other supply interruptions with second order effects on 
available manpower, and so on. A number of decisions will have to be made. Which payloads are 
removed from the next shuttle flight? Which payloads on Station will receive reduced resources, both 
of supplies and manpower? The reduction in one resource supplied, transportation, causes reductions in 
others, supplies and manpower, in complicated proportions. Thus, uncertainty in the supply of one 
resource causes uncertainty in the supply of all. 
For government funded projects, if there are cost uncertainties, then supply uncertainties 
become even more likely unless Congress and other users are willing to cover old costs in new 
budgets--no matter how high. If not, then higher than expected costs will lead to budget tightening in 
other areas which in turn will lead to reduced performance. Some natural reactions to unexpected 
tighter budgets are less training, less quality control, less maintenance, and fewer spares. All of these
imply increased supply uncertainty. Thus, even if the technology is known for sure, cost uncertainty 
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will cause supply uncertainty. In large continuing public R&D projects, the combination of unknown 
technology and unknown costs is inevitable and should be adequately planned for by management. 
2. Space Station Goals 
The announced goals for Space Station are as varied as the users. The advancement of science, 
the development of new and better technologies, the advancement of the commercial development of 
space resources and improved international relations are just some of the desired effects of the Space 
Station. Among the engineering goals for the Station are the demonstration that it can be done 
(feasibility) and the provision of a continuing infrastructure for users (performance). Among the 
economic goals for the Station are efficient operation and utilization (most bang for the buck) and the 
recovery of costs (users should pay). Other than feasibility and cost recovery, these are user oriented 
goals which are not output specific. That is, they are not of the form "put a man on Mars." Three goals 
are primary: feasibility, efficiency and cost coverage. The others can and should be accommodated 
within the context of these three. 
As a goal, feasibility is certainly necessary for all others. If the Station does not work, it cannot 
be used--efficiently or inefficiently. On the other hand, an excessive commitment to feasibility at any 
cost will generally imply an inefficient design, one characterized either by less performance than was 
possible for that expenditure or by a competitive disadvantage in the provision of services to 
commercial users or by both. Thus, although feasibility must come first, it cannot be the sole driver of 
design and operation. One must not just get into space; one must get there in a scientifically and 
commercially viable way. The number and quality of experiments, the benefits to users, and the 
ongoing ability of the Station to advance exploration are ultimately what is important. Just being there 
is not enough. 
As a goal, cost coverage requests that users be charged for the costs of the project. While this 
may be an accountant's dream, it is bad economics for public projects. If, in the private sector, revenues 
do not cover costs then this is a market signal that either management is inefficient or that benefits are 
less than the costs. In either case, this particular line of business should be discontinued. If revenues do 
not cover costs on a public project, there can be no such interpretation. The issue is simply whether 
Congress, representing the public, is willing to cover the shortfall. If the public benefits of the project 
appear to be worth it, then the deficit between costs and revenues will be covered as the "price" for the 
public benefits. If the public benefits are viewed by Congress as not worth it, then the project will not 
be funded and will therefore be stopped. The question is not whether costs should be covered but rather 
by whom? 
As a goal, efficiency is necessary to all others. Efficiency requests that resources be allocated so 
that there is no reallocation which can make anyone better off without making someone worse off; 
"anyone" includes users, taxpayers, contractors, designers, operators, etc. In many cases, efficiency is 
equivalent to maximizing total net benefits from the project and implies maximizing performance given 
expenditures. Two implications of efficiency are (a) given the (possibly random) vector of resources to 
be provided by Space Station, efficiency requires correct (efficient) payload design and correct 
(efficient) payload selection, and (b) given any specification of missions, the combined life-cycle costs 
of the Station plus the payloads needed to accomplish those missions should be minimized. If the 
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Station is designed and operated efficiently then other goals such as promoting commercialization can 
be more easily pursued. Efficiency does not rule out any other long-range goals; it merely augments 
them by providing more resources. The key to efficiency is the allocation of resources and not the 
allocation of costs. 
We need to differentiate between two aspects of efficiency. The first concept is short-run 
efficiency, that is, efficiency given the configuration and operating levels of the Space Station. This 
involves utilizing an existing Station as efficiently as possible and includes decisions about manifesting 
and timing, payload design, and payload selection. The other concept is long-run efficiency. This 
includes the Station technology and size in the efficiency calculation along with utilization. This is the 
concept of efficiency normally preferred by economists and is especially appropriate when one 
considers alternative growth and evolution scenarios. Tradeoffs between manned and unmanned 
exploration naturally arise in the long-term context. 
B. An Introduction to Organizational Design
Given the goals of Space Station and given the behavioral realities of information and 
incentives, policy analysis must determine how best to attain the goals subject to those constraints. 
Over the past three decades there has developed a theoretical and experimental body of knowledge 
aimed at exactly this type of analysis. Since many may not be familiar with this literature and since it is 
the natural framework in which to evaluate various policies for the operation of Space Station and other 
large projects, I will provide a brief introduction to what is known in the literature as implementation 
theory or mechanism design. As we will see it provides a systematic method within which one can not 
only evaluate the impact of suggested policies but also design new, and perhaps previously unsuspected 
solutions to achieve the desired goals. 
1 .  Background 
One purpose of engineering is to design devices that harness physical forces to serve certain 
specified goals, subject to the laws of nature. Similarly, the purpose of organizational design is to 
design devices that harness behavioral forces to serve certain specified goals, subject to the laws of 
nature. There are two simple analogies. The aeronautical engineer designs an airplane which will be 
able to fly between any two points to be specified by others at a later date; he does not choose the points, 
pilot the plane, or run the airline. The economist, as organizational designer, specifies the structure (the 
rules of the game) within which group decisions are to be made based on information provided by 
others at a later date; he does not provide the information, choose the actions to take, or manage the 
organization. 
A second analogy can be found in computer design. The computer programmer designs 
hardware and software which will elicit inputs from others and produce a collection of desired outputs. 
The economist designs an organizational structure which will elicit inputs from others and produce 
actions that accomplish the desired ends. It is not up to the economist, who presumably does not know
the scientific and engineering facts, to decide exactly which payloads should fly on a shuttle mission; it 
is up to the economist to design a policy that will elicit as much information as is necessary, from those 
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who best know, to allow the informed selection of payloads to achieve the stated goals. 
It is the imaginative combination of engineering design and organization design that holds the 
promise of success. Neither design will succeed for long without sensible integration with the other. 
(One must note that even if engineering decisions are made without a systematic organizational design, 
an implicit design decision will still have been made. The real issue is whether one can use what is 
known to improve on these "seat of the pants" solutions.) Aeronautical engineers, computer scientists, 
and economists strive to create structures so that those people with the requisite capabilities and 
information can more easily accomplish their goals. It is only the medium in which they work that is 
different. 
The fundamental theoretical and empirical fact which forms the basis for organizational design 
is that institutions matter predictably. For example, we know prices affect behavior in predictable 
ways. The "pancake" design of the Hughes satellite engine was clearly a response to the fact that a price 
was charged for length, as well as weight, on the shuttle. If one really knew the demands and costs 
relevant to the Space Station, one could "choose" prices to induce the "right" outcomes. However, since 
no one holds all the required information, institutions must be created that "calculate" the right prices. 
Markets do this naturally using the power of prices to inform, coordinate and guide decisions; many 
times, but not always, this results in an efficient allocation. Other institutions (such as regulatory 
agencies, cost-benefit studies, and political processes) can also coordinate, but do not always result in 
efficient allocations. 
Organizational design is constrained by two fundamental phenomena. The information needed 
to make the "optimal" decisions either is initially dispersed among a variety of participants or is more 
easily discoverable by some. The pharmaceutical industry probably has the best information about the 
benefits from production of drugs in micro-gravity, the variety of materials processing furnaces that 
could be used on the Space Station are best known to their manufacturers, contractors may have the best
estimates of the costs of producing particular sub-assemblies, and I know best what the benefits of the 
Space Station will be to me. If all the information were able to be correctly transfered to a central 
location, optimal decisions could be made. It is one pmpose of organizations to facilitate this effort. 
The designer of the organization must understand and accept this initial information dispersion. 
The second constraint is that individual agents who are in or who interact with the organization 
will generally act in their own self- interest. This is especially true if there are multiple goals and 
difficulties in monitoring or auditing. The designer of an organization must choose the structure so that 
any request of an individual to provide information or to carry out a task will be self enforcing. If such 
a choice is not made, then it must be recognized that many actions taken and much information 
provided may be misleading. This is not necessarily bad but is predictable and should be planned for. 
2. An Extended Example 
The simplest example of organizational design can be found in the following allocation 
problem. A seller owns an item of no value to him which, however, has some value to a number of 
potential buyers. Each buyer knows his own value and no one else can observe that value. Further, each 
buyer's value is independent of the others' .  (The results below change in very interesting ways if there 
is correlation between the values, as there will be if there are resale possibilities, or if one buyer can 
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benefit even though another buyer receives the item, as would occur with public goods. We do not, 
however, pursue these variations in this paper.) The efficient allocation gives the item to the buyer with 
the highest valuation. The problem is to accomplish this within the information and incentive 
constraints. We will consider six possible organizations to solve this problem. There are many others. 
Organization 1: First Price Sealed Bid Auction.
This organization, a pricing and allocation mechanism, asks each buyer to submit his value for 
the object (without knowing what any other buyer will say). The object will be awarded to the buyer 
with the highest "stated" value who will pay an amount to the seller equal to that stated value. If 
everyone is "honest" (in fact, if the buyer with the highest value is honest), the outcome will be 
efficient. However, the highest value buyer will be no better off than when he started since he will have 
to pay full value for the item. It is easy to see (theoretically and empirically) that all buyers will 
understate their true values for the object. It is a natural implication, of this attempt by each buyer to
gain something from the auction, that inefficient allocations may result; that is, the second-highest value 
buyer may bid more than the highest value buyer. Experimentally, this seems to happen 10-20% of the 
time when values are randomly assigned according to a uniform distribution and appears, theoretically, 
to be due to variations in risk attitudes among subjects (see Cox et al. [1982]). The natural self­
interested behavior of the buyers leads to inefficient allocations. 
Organization 2: English (Ascending Bid) Auction.
This organization asks each buyer to publicly state the value they place on the object (if they 
wish to). At any time there is one such "bid" outstanding, as a commitment to buy at a price equal to 
the stated value. If a higher bid than that is made it becomes the outstanding bid. When a prespecified 
time elapses between improving bids, the auction stops and the item is awarded to the holder of the 
outstanding bid for a price equal to that bid. The predictable outcome of this auction is that the highest 
value buyer will make the final bid which will be slightly more than the second highest value. The 
natural self-interested behavior of the buyers leads to an efficient allocation, even though the buyer with 
the highest value has misrepresented its true value by understating it. 
Organization 3: Posted Price.
A common organization for solving the allocation problem has the seller post (i.e., publicly 
state) a price at which he is willing to sell. If the seller chooses a price such that one and only one buyer 
agrees to that price, then an efficient allocation occurs. More likely, since the seller has no demand 
information, either no buyers or many buyers will be willing to pay this price. Thus, "posting a price" is 
only part of the description of the oraganization. How and when to adjust the price and when to give 
the item to which buyer must also be specified. For one example, suppose the price is never adjusted 
and the item is given to the first buyer who is willing to pay the posted price (first come first served). If 
no buyer accepts the offer then this is inefficient; if many buyers are willing to accept the offer this is 
still usually inefficient since the item may well go to a buyer with a lower value. For another example, 
suppose the price is adjusted until just one buyer is willing to accept the latest offer (note that this 
requires reneging on the original offer). If the original posted price was too high (no one accepted) 
lowering the price will be similar to a Dutch auction (see Cox et al. [1982]). If the original posted price 
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was too low (more than one buyer accepts) raising the price will be similar to an English auction. (For 
experimental evidence on posted prices with many sellers, see Plott and Smith, [1978].) Of course, 
buyers will anticipate the price changes and react in their own interest. The process of price formation 
will affect the behavior of buyers and, therefore, the allocation. If the analyst recognizes the incentive 
effects of the "price adjustment rule" the allocation can be efficient. If, however, prices are posted and 
never adjusted in response to market information, the allocation will be inefficient and revenue will be 
less than possible. 
Organization 4: Second Price Sealed Bid Auction.
In this organization each buyer is asked to write down the value of the item to him (without
seeing the others' stated values). The item will be awarded to the buyer with the highest stated value 
who will pay a price equal to the stated value of the second highest bidder. The predictable theoretical 
and empirical outcome of this auction, once bidders understand the rules, is that each buyer will bid 
their true value, the highest value bidder will get the item and pay a price equal to the second highest 
true value. The outcome is efficient In fact the outcome is identical to organization 2, the English
auction, even though the apparent information being provided (the bids of the buyers) is significantly 
different. Here there is no misrepresentation. 
Organization 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Each possible buyer is asked to tell an interviewer the value of the object to him . He is exhorted 
to "tell the truth." A consultant will process the information, do a cost-benefit calculation and tell the 
seller what the outcome should be (who should get the item and how much he should pay). The seller 
will presumably follow the consultant's advice. If the consultant uses "standard cost-benefit principles" 
he will accept the stated values as the true values and assign the item to the buyer with the highest stated 
value. Whether this organization is or is not efficient depends on the "pricing policy" associated with 
this allocation; that is, how much will the receiving buyer pay? If the answer is nothing, then all will 
have an incentive to overstate their benefits to the cost-benefit analyst and the allocation will generally 
be inefficient. If a price near to the highest stated value is charged in an attempt to maximize revenue, 
then it takes very little insight or effort to recognize that this organization is identical in effect to the 
first-price sealed bid auction (Organization 1) and that one should expect inefficient outcomes to occur. 
If the analyst recognizes these incentive effects of the "pricing rule" on the quality of information, he 
should announce, before eliciting the information, that the price paid by the recipient of the item will 
equal the second highest stated value. This is the "market-like" solution and, as in Organizations 2 and 
4, will provide the appropriate, self-enforcing incentives for all potential buyers to correctly reveal their 
information. The allocation will be efficient. Of course, one could certainly use the second-price sealed 
bid auction (Organization 4), where the commitment to the pricing rule is clearer, instead of a cost­
benefit analyst. From the point of view of efficiency the allocations and the organizations are the same 
(ignoring, of course, the costs of the organizations themselves). 
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Organization 6: Sell-A-Dollar.
This organization is the same as the English auction, with one crucial difference. At the end of 
the auction the highest bidder will receive the item but now the second highest bidder will pay an 
amount equal to his bid for the item. (In practice, one must constrain bidders not to bid more than the 
cash they have in their pockets.) Test your organizational skills by predicting the outcome of this 
auction. Hint: It will rarely be efficient.
Summary Table 
* 
Organization Honest Revelation Efficient Expected Revenue 
1 .  First Price Auction no no higher 
2. English Auction no yes same 
3. Posted Price
a. first come-first served n.a. no lower 
b. adjust price n.a. yes a little higher 
4. Second Price Auction yes yes same 
5. Cost-Benefit
a. pay nothing no no lower 
b. pay highest value no no higher 
c. pay second highest value yes yes same 
6. Sell-A-Dollar no no much higher 
The entry in this column compares the expected revenue to the seller to the statistical expectation of the second highest 
actual value to buyers with some risk aversion. This can be viewed as a measure of the extent of cost coverage. 
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3. Theoretical and Empirical Facts
The principles of organizational design are derived from the mathematics of the theory of 
games. A well developed body of knowledge, known as mechanism theory, has been created over the 
last three decades. The applications of this theory have been mostly in the area of single object 
auctions, like those above, and public goods allocation problems. Currently, the theory of regulation is 
being updated using the results and methods of this literature. (See Baron and Myerson [1982], Chao 
and Wilson [1985], Cox and Isaac [1986], or Hong and Plott [1982].) In spite of this, in practice, 
mechanism design is a custom process. There is no one institution that handles all possible situations 
even if there is a single goal such as efficiency. For example, none of the theory developed to date is 
directly applicable to the Space Station problem, although some is certainly suggestive of possible 
approaches. 
The facts of organizational design are also developing, but at a slower pace than the theory. 
One reason should be obvious: unless one can directly observe the values of the item to each of the 
buyers in our auction example, one has no way of knowing whether a particular design leads to the 
theoretically predicted behavior. Market data is of no use. Fortunately there is an alternative to the 
economists' traditional data sources. Using experimental methods it is now possible, in a controlled 
environment, to test and validate organizational designs in much the same way that a wind tunnel is 
used to test airfoil designs. This means that organizational designs can be systematically studied before 
implementation. Nonetheless, just as a successful wind tunnel test does not guarantee a successful 
aircraft flight, a successful experimental validation of an organization does not guarantee its 
performance. But it is true that the economics laboratory has been shown to be useful in identifying 
organizational designs that are fatally flawed, and in providing an environment that is sensitive enough 
that the effects of subtle changes in organizational design can be measured and organizations can be 
fine-tuned. The availability of such "test-beds" means that one need not rely only on theory, conjecture, 
opinion, or intuition in organizational design. A factual basis for any particular structure can be created. 
Ill. MECHANISM DESIGN FOR SPACE STATION OPERATION AND EVOLUTION 
Having established the framework of analysis, mechanism design, and the goals and constraints 
faced in the Space Station, we can now address some of the basic policy issues in the management of 
the Space Station. Although one could also provide this type of analysis for the design and acquisition 
phases of the Space Station, I will concentrate in this paper on its management after it has become 
operational, since many of the major policy issues can be highlighted in this context. Length 
considerations prevent analysis of both phases. 
Given the initial operating configuration (IOC) of the Space Station, the supply of resources 
which will be able to be allocated to users is determined but not necessarily known with certainty. The 
resource allocation decisions to be made once the Station is operational involve payload design 
(whether to automate or to use Station manpower), payload selection (should a science project displace 
a commercial R&D project?), the allocation of Station resources to each payload (does that project 
deserve 1 kilowatt of power or 1.2?), the allocation of resources to station operation (should manpower 
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be shifted from ground operations to the design and development of a space port?), and, eventually, 
when and how to expand the Station to provide more resources (when does one add another module?). 
We consider the broad outlines of three possible organizations or allocation mechanisms, designed to 
guide the operation and evolution of the IOC, and analyze their ability to provide the appropriate 
framework within which to pursue the goals of cost recovery, short-run efficiency, and long-run 
efficiency. Each design is described only in gross terms and should in fact be considered a class of 
designs: A summary comparison table is presented at the end of this section. More specific analysis is 
postponed to the Appendix. 
A. Team Management and Cost Recovery: The Engineers' Approach 
This organizational structure assumes that the project is a team effort. It is the natural extension 
of the principles of small project management to the control of large organizations. The team, for the 
Space Station, includes designers, builders, users, and operators. In its purest form, every team member 
is assumed to share the same goal and be willing to provide any information requested. I refer to this as 
the "engineers' approach" since this seems to be the first structure of choice in a group design process. 
It is a "hands on" form of management with direct (generally hierarchical) control of as many decisions 
as possible. While there are many reasonable variations, I will look at only one potential allocation 
mechanism which I hope stimulates discussion of the issues. 
1. Description
In this organizational structure, the pricing policy is oriented to cost recovery (usually based on
past operations) and not to resource allocation. One natural candidate is "STS plus a percentage 
surcharge to cover Station costs." Discounts can be readily given to "encourage use." Manifesting and 
allocation of Station resources is accomplished by a committee (or a project manager) which uses 
various devices to establish priorities among competing ends. One prominent priority system often 
proposed is "first come-first served." This committee also directs design and growth, determining what 
they think is needed through a variety of studies similar to cost-benefit analyses. This description is 
essentially a continuation of current STS pricing policy, which uses a slightly different priority system 
(see Banks, Ledyard and Porter (1986] for an excellent summary of STS policy compiled by David 
Porter). It is a "builder-operator oriented" as opposed to a "user oriented" policy since the designers and 
builders (unintentionally) determine user allocations rather than the reverse. 
2. Ideal Conditions
Under some conditions this mechanism may be successful in the pursuit of its goals. There 
must be known and shared goals such as "land people on Mars and return them." This condition is most 
easily met by projects which are not continuing and which do not really involve extensive interactions 
with users whose unknown needs evolve over time. Information should be commonly known or easily 
discoverable and there should be minimal gains to misrepresentation. The former requires little 
uncertainty; the latter requires small common costs and a consistent reward structure based on strong 
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leadership. Very accurate cost and benefit infonnation must be available; either there should be little 
uncertainty or benefits should so far outweigh costs that what uncertainty there is does not matter. 
3. Performance for Space Station
It is fairly easy to predict the effect of this type of organization on the performance of Space 
Station and its ability to pursue its goals of efficiency and cost recovery. 
At first glance cost recovery seems straightforward since the percentage surcharge can be made 
as large as possible. One must, however, consider the reaction of users. Even if the Station is fully 
used, the percentage surcharge required for full cost recovery may be so high that some potential users 
are rationed out; their benefits are less than the amount they are asked to pay. In this case the surcharge
would have to be raised (fewer users must each pay more). This increase would eliminate more users 
and so on, leading to an inevitable "death spiral." Eventually Space Station operators will try to give 
discounts to encourage use, or they will argue that average costs are really lower than previously 
thought. One will have CBO studies, economists' and engineers' cost estimate studies, and numerous 
administrative board hearings. All of this unproductive effort will be designed to try to discover the
value of a single number (the life-cycle cost of the Space Station) which is inevitably undiscoverable 
because the future is uncertain and the present is hidden by standard accounting techniques. 
This scenario is not too far-fetched: it is exactly what happened to mainframe computers at 
many institutions that tried to allocate their use (recover their costs) by charging users a price equal to 
average costs. Users switched to PC's except for a very small number who had no alternative. The 
combination of a pricing policy with unanticipated, undesirable implications and the availability of a 
specialized technology competing with the multipurpose mainframe led to an inefficient allocation of 
resources. In most cases, actual costs were never recovered and never known for sure. We know that 
Ariane is the STS 's equivalent of the PC for satellite launches. It is not inconceivable that there will be 
the equivalent of Ariane for the Space Station (such as privately or publicly financed free-flyers). 
The implications for short-run efficiency are also easily predictable. Even if the committee that 
allocates resources and manifests payloads is able to identify all high benefit missions and their relative 
benefits (which is unlikely), there will still be inefficiencies in the utilization of Space Station. Payload 
designers (certainly those in the commercial sector), in response to the pricing policy of "shuttle plus a 
percentage," will build payloads which conserve on shuttle (i.e., are light and short) but which do not 
conserve on potentially critical Station resources such as power and man-power. Thus, for example, we 
will not see robotics designed into the payloads, but instead will see heavy demands for astronaut time 
to monitor and operate payloads. 
Another predictable implication of this allocation mechanism is that, unless the percentage 
surcharge is adjusted for time on Station, short-tenn projects will be passed up in favor of very long­
term projects which will not only use a lot of Station resources but will use them over a long time 
period. If the surcharge is adjusted for time on Station, long-term projects will be eliminated in favor of 
short projects, intensively using resources. 
Finally, because the supply of Station resources will be uncertain (perfect reliability is infinitely 
costly) users will adjust their designs to adapt to the probabilites that they will be "bumped" during 
resource flow interruptions. If a priority scheme similar to that for STS is used, we will observe that
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both commercial and scientific R&D payloads, each of which fly at a discount and low priority, will 
tend to be smaller than is efficient so that they can "fit in" as easily as possible and be easy to reallocate. 
The excess demand for mid-deck lockers on shuttles (see Egan [1985]) is traceable in large part to this 
reasonable response by users to the risks of delays and supply uncertainties, i.e., the price of "not 
fitting." The loss due to the inability of this fonn of organization to deal with uncertainty due to 
reliability can be most easily understood by considering materials processing payloads. Virtually no 
graduate dissertations have been written in the area of materials processing in micro-gravity because of 
STS reliability which (prior to Challenger) implied a three to four year wait since mid-deck lockers 
could not be used. No one was willing to chance having to wait that long even when provisionally 
scheduled earlier. The loss of this science means we now have little infonnation that we need to 
evaluate the role of materials processing on Space Station. 
The effect of a team managed structure on long-run efficiency is also clear. Given the extensive 
technical and market uncertainty, the multidimensionality of the resources supplied by the Station, and 
the variety and numbers of potential users, there is no way that the infonnation needed to make efficient 
long-run decisions will be available. Cost-benefit studies will be able to provide little guidance under 
these conditions. Any claims about costs and benefits should be viewed with healthy scepticism. As we 
have seen, payload designs and resource demands will be skewed by the pricing policy and will not be 
representative of efficient use. Thus, one will not be able to use demand infonnation to plan efficient 
expansion or contraction. One will then only be able to ask users what they want and contractors what 
it will cost, with all the revelation problems that will entail. 
If expansion is not efficient in the long-run, there will be two effects worth noting. First, other 
designers and builders will be able to discover a more efficient design that would be able to effectively 
compete Space Station out of business for any use that is not heavily subsidized. Second, even if 
subsidies are granted to prevent the defection of users to these more efficient designs, there will be a 
significant waste of the resources available for space exploration and development. More science 
missions and more commercial ventures would have been possible. The benefits from these will be 
foregone because of the inevitable and pennanent long-run inefficiencies. 
4. Other Comments
An obvious observation is that the team fonn of management is remarkably similar to that of 
"centrally planned economies." The advantages and drawbacks of such systems are well-known. When 
resources are allocated centrally by bureaucratic quotas, managers have little knowledge about or 
interest in controlling costs. Such a system can be compatible with the achievement of crude 
quantitative goals but has no mechanism to improve quality or efficiency. 
One might be tempted to ask why this fonn of organization would survive if the inefficiencies 
are so bad. The answer is in the combination of political and engineering realities. The important 
political fact is that the political process and those involved in it, such as Congressmen, are generally 
myopic. Elections occur in the next one to six years; ten years is too far ahead to carry much 
importance. The important engineering fact is that these projects must be designed and built before they 
are operated. This means that design decisions are more imminent and operations decisions appear 
deferrable. In this environment, the team structure aimed at the completion of a feasible design can 
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survive. Efficiency in operation and utilization can always be postponed. To emphasize this point let 
me make a small digression. I believe these two facts helped shape the organizational structure within 
which the Challenger accident occured. Although no individual intentionally caused the events leading 
to that disaster, their behavior was most certainly shaped by organizational forces. The accident was, 
therefore, as much an organizational design failure as it was an engineering design failure. Without 
repair of both flaws, Space Station and other ongoing, long-term, operating projects will be subject to 
similar risks. 
:w1llle it may be argued that the inefficiencies from the mismanagement of any one project may 
not be big enough to cause NASA to consider a significant alteration in the method of doing business, 
one must remember that these effects cumulate. Imperfect allocation on a current project means 
imperfect information for future projects which might live off of this project. Inefficiencies in the 
design and operation of a major R&D project means fewer science and research missions for that 
project. If the next project depends on the results of these experiments, then the next project is either 
delayed or inefficiently designed. A continual loss in the rate of possible R&D occurs at an increasing 
rate relative to what might have been accomplished if efficient design and operation were achieved. In 
simple terms, the fact that the shuttle is expensive (and probably inefficient) makes access to the Space 
Station more difficult. If a cheaper delivery system were to be developed, more science and technology 
development would be able to be pursued with the desirable result that our long-run goals in space, 
whatever they are, would be more rapidly attained. Postponing consideration of possible alternative 
organizational designs merely further delays long-term scientific success. 
B. Cost Based Allocation and Long-Run Efficiency: The Economists ' Approach 
This organizational structure is oriented towards the goal of long-run efficiency and begins to 
address the information and incentive issues that arise in all large organizational structures. It is the 
natural extension of markets to the control of large organizations. I refer to this as the "economists' 
approach" since this seems to be the first structure of choice for any regulatory or public enterprise 
pricing problem. (For an excellent application of this analytic framework to STS, see Toman and 
Macauley [1986].) It is an organizational structure which does not require direct "hands on" 
management but, instead, indirectly controls decisions. While there are many variations, I will only 
consider an idealized version. 
1. Description
Pricing policy is oriented to long-run resource allocation and is designed to provide information 
to users about the relative scarcity of Station resources and to provide incentives to payload designers 
and users to conserve on critical resources. Formal analysis under certainty leads one inevitably to the 
conclusion that to achieve long-run efficiency when users are net benefit maximizers or team players the 
price of a resource should equal the "long-run marginal cost" (LRMC) of that resource. If costs are 
uncertain, it  is usually suggested that expected values be used. Capacity of the project is to be adjusted 
in respose to demands at those LRMC prices. That is, if demand is larger than current supplies, then 
capacity should be expanded; if demand is less than current supplies, then capacity should be 
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contracted. Lump-sum discounts or  entry fees can be added to pursue the additional goal of cost 
recovery or to encourage use. It is not clear what is recommended in the short-run (before supplies are 
fully adjusted to demands) about manifesting and Station resource allocation, especially if supply 
adjusts slowly and current supplies are uncertain. Presumably a committee, similar to that in the team 
structure, would make the decisions or there would be some type of ad hoc rationing scheme, such as 
"first come-first served." This allocation mechanism is a "long-run user oriented" pricing policy based 
on both cost and demand information and is often touted as the natural solution to the "efficiency 
failures" of average cost pricing. 
2. Ideal Conditions
Under some conditions this mechanism may be successful in the pursuit of its goals. One must 
have very accurate cost information, including an accurate model of the incremental effects on costs and 
design requirements needed to supply more of each resource to be used by payloads. Further, this 
model and the actual designs must minimize the life-cycle costs of supplying the additional resources. 
It is not necessary for Station management to have any information on benefits to implement this policy 
successfully. It is also not necessary for users to be certain of benefits although they must be able to 
assess the uncertainties and evaluate their own willingness to bear risk. There should be a technology 
which provides a fairly stable supply of resources to the users. The uncertainty surrounding STS flight 
schedules is an example which may violate this condition. A predictable and constant flow of electric 
power from a utility is an example which may satisfy this condition. Design and construction 
technology must be such that capacity is easily and rapidly expandable so that adjustment can readily be 
made to demands. This is not as necessary if demands are stable and predictable. 
3.  Performance for Space Station 
This allocation mechanism has vastly different but still predictable results for the performance 
of Space Station. 
It is inevitable for projects with large common costs, like Space Station, that a policy of 
charging prices equal to (expected) long-run marginal cost prices will not recover enough revenue to 
cover costs. There are two possibilities for making up the deficit. First, one can consider the common 
costs to be expenditures towards the public benefit and simply expect Congress to pay for them; of 
course, if Congress refuses then the project would have to be scrapped. The other alternative is to 
charge a "hook-up fee" which cannot depend on the resource use by the payload. The drawback is that 
this leads immediately to problems similar to those for average cost pricing: attempts to recover too 
much of the deficit may lead to some payloads being eliminated that, on efficiency criteria, should fly. 
When cost recovery is as important as efficiency, economists sometimes offer a hybrid 
approach which combines features of the team approach and the LRMC approach. Referred to by many 
as Ramsey pricing, it seeks to maximize net benefits subject to costs being recovered. In our case, if the 
STS were the only way to arrive and depart from the Station (it would be relatively inelastically 
demanded), Ramsey pricing would involve charging (expected) long-run marginal cost prices for all 
resources on Space Station and charging a price for STS high enough to recover the costs of both the 
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STS and the Station. Supply is then adjusted, as before, to satisfy demand at these prices. If STS is not 
the sole access to the Station, then the pricing rules are not straightforward and would require extensive 
demand information which is not and will not be available. 
This cost-based pricing organization is not much better than the team structure in pursuing 
short-run efficiency. First, long-run marginal cost prices will not inform payload designers and 
operators about current relative scarcities and, since capacity cannot be adjusted in the short-run (by 
definition), cannot lead payloads to be efficiently designed for short-run operation. Second, since 
LRMC prices cannot be responsive to supply uncertainties and short-run variations, they cannot provide 
guidance for mission selection and manifesting or for short-term rationing of temporarily unavailable 
resources. 
It is even possible, with multiple outputs, that LRMC prices will perversely affect short-run 
efficiency. If a resource with a low LRMC has a high variance of supply while another resource with a 
high LRMC has a low variance of supply, then payload designers are in fact misled by LRMC prices 
and efficiency may be better served, in the short-run, by ignoring them. Of course then one should not 
use the short-run utilization data to adjust long-run capacities. 
In summary, long-run marginal cost pricing provides no help towards the goal of short-run 
efficiency. It is no wonder that managers, engineers, and operators of speculative R&D projects with 
demand variability and supply uncertainty look with some suspicion upon economists ' suggestions that 
prices be set at (expected) LRMC and that supply be produced to fulfill demand at those prices. It is
true that, at those rare times when a decision to expand facilities is made, a LRMC pricing policy would 
have generated invaluable information. Nevertheless, decisions must be made each day about 
manifesting, rationing during operations, payload design and utilization. These decisions are made in 
the short-run environment and these are the decisions that most manpower and management effort is 
concentrated on. LRMC pricing provides no organizational help in this area and, worse, may actually 
impede efforts. 
This organization and allocation mechanism does accomplish long-run efficiency, if the 
required cost information is available, if prices are always "updated" on the correct information, if 
supply and demand uncertainty are small after awhile, if all users take these LRMC prices as given and 
are motivated to produce cost effective payloads, and if the size of the Station is adjusted to demand at 
these prices. Without a significant change in culture, neither the first nor the last two of these will be 
true for Space Station. 
The first condition will not be true unless design and acquisition procedures are changed. As 
noted in Section IIA, current cost estimation procedures are primitive at best and misleading at worst. It 
is predictable that, as in public utility regulation, the process by which the actual value of marginal costs 
are chosen will be controversial and soon entangled in administrative law. The definition of marginal 
cost, as well as its measurement, will be questioned. These problems will be made more severe by the 
multiplicity of resources to be supplied to users. 
The second to last condition will not be true unless both commercial and NASA science and 
technology missions are charged for resource use on the Station and provided incentives to be cost 
effective in their payload designs. Neither is true on STS. NASA payload designers, the scientists and 
engineers, are not charged and are provided little incentive to be cost effective beyond that required to 
fit. Commercial payload designers do have incentives to be cost effective if charged, but they are 
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usually granted subsidies on STS. 
4. Other Comments 
It is only recently that economists have begun to understand the serious effects of uncertainty 
on the usual implications of the standard models of public enterprises and regulated firms. It would 
have been simple and easy if one could have analyzed the uncertainty case by taldng expected values 
and then repeating the complete information analysis. Unfortunately this is not a legitimate procedure: 
the implications of a careful analysis under uncertainty and the ad hoc analysis based on expected 
values are significantly different whenever the uncertainties are large and the speed of reaction to 
unexpected events is slow. One needs to develop new techniques to deal with uncertainty. 
C. Benefit Based Allocation and Short-Run Efficiency: A Custom-Design Approach 
This organizational structure and allocation mechanism accepts as inevitable the uncertainties 
about costs, benefits, demands, and supplies. It also accepts as inevitable the incentives each participant 
faces. The philosophy is to custom-design the organization to achieve short-run efficiency and then, if 
possible, long-run efficiency subject to the information and incentive constraints. This is not to be done 
by adding more monitoring, more managers, or more accountants. Instead it is to be done through 
harnessing natural behavioral forces to minimize organizational costs. As with the previous two 
structures, there are many possible variations but I will describe the general outlines as stylized facts to 
stimulate discussion. 
1 .  Description 
The pricing policy associated with this mechanism is oriented towards the efficient utilization 
of the IOC Space Station. It is accepted that, because of uncertainties in the housekeeping technologies , 
supply will be uncertain and service interruptions may occur and that there are significant uncertainties 
about both the operating costs and the benefits to be derived from any particular mission set. There is 
an "optimal" allocation mechanism for environments similar to this: the priority auction, in which users 
bid for priority in the utilization of randomly provided resources. (See Harris and Raviv [ 1981] and 
Chao and Wilson [1985].) There are a number of variations which could be explored. Two promising 
designs, based on the principles of Demand Revelation, have been subjected to theoretical and 
laboratory evaluation. (See Banks, Ledyard, and Porter [1985a].) I will describe one for which the 
process is simple and could be managed as a "public auction" through an online real time computer 
bulletin board. In this mechanism, each user may state a resource demand vector, a priority 
classification, and a bid. As in the English auction described earlier, a user displaces one or more 
current holders of positions in that priority class if the amount of his bid is higher than those he must 
displace to make room for him. All bids are considered binding once made and, at the end of the 
auction (when there are no improving bids after a pre-specified period of time), the final position 
holders determine the allocation. Each pays the price he bids and receives the priority allocation 
requested. Those who are in the higher priority class are manifested first and are the last to be 
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"bumped" if resources become temporarily unavailable. The mechanism produces a full set of 
contingent plans consistent with users' risk preferences; short-tenn reallocations are reasonably 
efficiently planned. To increase efficiency a little, a lower bound equal to short-run marginal cost could 
be placed on the bids if such a number is discoverable, which it may not be unless it is zero. 
In this mechanism, the auction has replaced both the committee and marginal costs as allocator 
of resources and price setter. Growth and evolution decisions, however, must still be made. While 
there remains some theoretical and experimental work to do, it appears that the natural mechanism, 
which complements the priority auction, for deciding on capacity changes is to use the infonnation in 
the bids of the short-tenn priority auctions to infer the marginal benefit to be achieved from an increase 
in any resource. This is especially true for a variation of the priority auction which requires separate
bids on each resource. For example, comparison of the bids for high-priority manpower to bids for high 
priority use of the unmanned platfonn space and a comparison of both of those to proposed costs of 
provision of more manpower or more platfonn space could provide invaluable infonnation for manned­
unmanned decisions. The managers of Space Station could announce (given Congressional approval) a 
willingness to pay any contractor an amount equal to that marginal benefit for the expansion of 
additional units. If a contractor agreed to supply at that price then expansion would be in an efficient 
direction. If several were to agree, one could select according to other desirable criteria. There would 
be no need to measure either the costs or the profits of contractors; however, one would need to measure 
perfonnance. There would be no need to request benefit infonnation from users. 
2. Ideal Conditions 
Under some conditions this mechanism may be successful in the pursuit of its goals. The 
mechanism will perfonn best if there are supply uncertainties. If supply and demand are certain there is 
nothing to bid for except the scarce resources; bids will be lower. With uncertainty, some users are 
willing to pay a premium for priority service. In fact, high benefit missions will be willing to bid more 
than low benefit missions. Therefore, if supply is uncertain, the priority auction does elicit valid 
infonnation about the relative benefits of various potential missions and does allocate resources 
efficiently to the highest benefit missions. 
The process requires that users not collude in a way that prevents bids which otherwise might 
be made. As with any auction, such as the English auction we discussed in section II, if the user with 
the highest value and the user with the second highest value can collude, the bidder with the highest 
value can get the item for a price equal to the third highest value plus a small payment to the bidder 
with the second highest value who simply never bids. Of course these two must be able to identify 
themselves to each other before the auction and to enforce their agreement. This is easier in oral 
auctions than in sealed bid auctions (Milgrom [1985]). Note that the item is still allocated efficiently; 
only the revenue received by the seller is less when these buyers collude. Thus short-run efficiency is 
not affected. However, the infonnation needed for long-run efficiency is degraded and less expansion 
of capacity will occur under the rules above than is desirable. (It should be recognized that not only 
auctions, but committees and other mechanisms are also potentially manipulable by these types of 
coalitions.) 
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3. Perfonnance for Space Station
Let us look at the effect of this organization on the pursuit of the goals of cost recovery and 
efficiency. 
There is no reason to believe that total cost recovery will be achieved if this pricing mechanism 
is in operation since there is nothing in the process that is sensitive to cost infonnation (other than the 
fact that someone must cover the shortfalls). Nevertheless one of the theoretical properties of this 
mechanism is that it does raise most of the revenue that is possible given the incomplete infonnation 
about benefits and the desire to allocate efficiently. This theoretical possibility has been shown to also 
be true in the laboratory (see Banlcs, Ledyard and Porter [1985a]). While we have no idea whether this 
extracts the maximum revenue from the buyers that is consistent with short-run efficiency, we do know 
that a significant contribution will be made towards the costs of the project 
This organization and allocation mechanism does accomplish much of what it is designed to do, 
the short-run efficient allocation of user resources on the Station. As indicated earlier, the process 
elicits infonnation (bids, proposed allocations, and priorities) in such a way that higher benefit missions 
tend to bid higher and, therefore are assigned a higher priority to resources. The difference between this 
and a committee process is that the users detennine the bids and priorities, and have an incentive to 
reveal their beliefs about the benefits correctly. Since most of the operation of the Space Station is done 
in the short-run context, the ablility of any mechanism to accomplish a major portion of short-run 
efficiency means that not only will more missions fly but also there will be more high benefit missions: 
more science and more commerce will occur. 
It is theoretically possible that 100% short-run efficiency can be achieved. It is experimentally 
true that, for the limited situations we have had time to analyze, at least 80-90% efficiency is achieved 
when this mechanism is used. 'lrhis is a significant improvement over the 55-65% achieved through a 
posted price policy with a first come first served priority scheme. Interestingly the key advantage of the 
priority auction, as exhibited in the laboratory, is not that it selects "better" missions but that it leads 
payload design choices to be made that "fit better" and that, therefore, leave room for missions that 
would otherwise not fly. One achieves more missions and more benefits at the same cost. Work is 
currently underway at Caltech to improve the perfonnance of the auction and to test its capabilities in a 
wider collection of experimental environments along the lines in Banlcs et al. [ 1985a]. Supporting 
evidence on the efficiency increase from another set of Space Station experiments can be found in 
Banks et al. ( 1986]. Given the current data we feel that the priority auction represents a real potential 
breakthrough in the short-tenn management, scheduling and planning, of interruptible services such as 
Space Station. 
The theoretical and experimental perfonnance of this mechanism with respect to long-run 
efficiency is still not completely understood. The research is straightforward and feasible (some 
directions are given in the Appendix), but we have postponed it We believe that the short-tenn 
properties are of more importance since they represent the major area in which extensive inefficiencies 
probably exist and in which imaginative and systematically designed mechanisms can provide the most 
improvements over current operating and management methods. The research question is whether 
accurate long-tenn marginal benefit infonnation can be extracted from the bids made in the short-run 
priority auction, whether the use of this infonnation has a deleterious effect on its quality, and whether 
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the design and acquisition process can be improved through the use of the infonnation. Preliminary 
work leaves us optimistic that user driven growth and expansion is not only desirable but possible (see 
Chao and Wilson for the one-dimensional solution). 
4. Other Comments 
Why would any large organization adopt new ways of operating that were designed by someone 
who really didn't know the business? After all, these designs may never have been used before and it 
may be really costly to reeducate the people in the organization so that they know how to deal with the 
new ways. One always knows how to use the current system to pursue one's ends. Why take a risk on 
an untried system especially if the transition costs are high? Traditionally the burden of proof has been 
on the challenger of the old system. 
It is my opinion that this tradition is slowly yielding to new possibilities. The availability of 
increasingly sophisticated and realistic experimental "test beds" can provide the decision maker with 
convincing data about the comparative perfonnance of the existing mechanism and its challenger. The 
analytically tractable, theoretically desirable, wierd-sounding organization (dredged from the 
imagination of some ivory-tower designer) can be tested, adjusted, revised and retested to be made 
compatible with the realities of the environment. Potential difficulties, such as large uncertainties, which 
have generally been casually assumed away by both economic theorists and practitioners, can now be 
confronted in a more systematic fashion. 
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SUMMARY COMPARISON OF THREE ORGANIZATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophy 
Primary goal 
Orientation 
Information Used 
DESCRIPTION 
Pricing Policy 
Resource Allocation 
Evolution 
IDEAL CONDITIONS 
PERFORMANCE 
Sources of Problems 
Cost Recovery 
Short-run Efficiency 
Long-run Efficiency 
Allocated Cost Recovery Marginal Cost Based 
team effort 
engineer's choice 
hands on 
feasibility 
builder 
technology-based 
STS + %  
deep discounts 
committee 
cost/benefit studies 
team players 
known and shared goals 
common info. 
no information 
processing constraints 
ignores benefit 
data and operations 
? 
no 
mimic market 
economist's choice 
indirect control 
long-run 
efficiency 
user 
cost-based 
post 
ExLRMC 
? 
fulfill demand
team players or 
net-benefit maximizer 
accurate cost info. 
stable resource supply 
linear cost structure 
easy to expand 
ignores reliability 
and maintainability 
no 
no 
payloads too small 
payloads do not conserve on critical resources 
contingencies are unplanned 
no yes if all pay 
and minimize costs 
IV. EPILOGUE: CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SYMPOSIUM
User Driven Pricing 
mechanism design 
my choice 
user control 
short-run/long-run 
efficiency 
user 
benefit-based 
negotiated 
priority contracts 
contracts 
impute benefits 
team player or 
net-benefit maximizers 
random supply 
modular design 
accurate reliability 
information 
some 
yes 
yes 
The design of organizations to pursue goals such as efficiency must be sensitive to three aspects 
of the environment: technical and engineering realities, information dispersion, and the motivations of 
the members of the organization. A public pioneer project, such as Space Station, created on the cutting 
edge of new technology and free from the discipline of the marketplace, illustrates many of the 
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difficulties involved. As we have seen, neither the team structure favored by engineers nor the cost­
based pricing policy favored by economicsts is adequate for the task of efficient management of Space 
Station. The former ignores motivations, incentives, and information processing constraints; the latter 
ignores informational and engineering realities. In reaction to these inadequacies, I have described a 
third alternative, based on priority contracts, which promises to perform significantly better than the 
other two in this environment characterized by much uncertainty. It is possible that even better 
alternatives could be found through a systematic, coherent research program. 
Let me conclude with two opinions which I now strongly hold as a result of my analysis of the 
economics and management of Space Station. 
A. It is time for a cultural change in the management of large public R&D projects, such as
those in NASA. The "seat of the pants" operations based on historical accident must be replaced with a 
systematic approach to the pursuit of goals. Forcing new projects into old management structures, such 
as Space Station into the organization created for Apollo, will only produce low efficiency and retard 
scientific and technical advancement Similarly, the continued addition of more manpower (auditors, 
monitors, and other layers of managers) will not overcome the handicap of an inappropriate 
organization. Just as the attempt to use 500,000 men to make an automobile fly is doomed to failure 
because of physical laws, so the attempt to use more men to find the "true" cost and technology of Space 
Station is doomed because of behavioral laws. Creative and imaginative management and economics is 
absolutely necessary to the successful pursuit and encouragement of creative and imaginative science 
and engineering. 
B.  We need an extensive research and training program to upgrade the analytic policy skills of 
both engineers and economists so they can cope with the requirements of the management of research 
and development on the cutting edge of technology. It is the discoveries of the 70' s and 80 's in 
economics that provide the foundations for the design of appropriate organizations. Further research in 
areas known as information economics, implementation and incentives, and experimental economics is 
vital. Pouring money into the development of new technology without the simultaneous development 
of appropriate management tools is foolhardy and short-sighted. The benefits to society of advances in 
our ability to manage large public projects such as Space Station are as extensive and far-reaching as 
any advances in hardware. Research on organizational design must be expanded if our scientific and 
technological visions for the future are not to be prevented from realization because of inappropriate 
organizations and management policies. 
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APPENDIX: A PRICING PRIMER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this relatively self-contained but terse appendix I present a simplified version of the basic 
analytics which lie behind the discussions in the paper. For many economists this presentation will be 
familiar and somewhat trivial (except perhaps for environments F, G, H and I, below) since it is 
designed to summarize and emphasize, for non-specialists, the basic principles and implications that lie 
behind the claims I presented earlier. I have tried to minimize the abstraction and have provided 
references to papers where detailed versions can be found. Those wishing to find out more about 
models of public enterprises in general, especially in situations under certainty, should read the 
excellent, relatively non-technical analysis by Reese [1985] . 
II. BASICS
The following is a list of the variables and other components of the basic model we will 
analyze. Those interested in more Space Station detail should consult Ledyard [1984]. I use capital 
letters to denote variables and functions related to the Space Station itself and use lower case letters to 
represent the analogous variables and functions for payloads. 
Variables (can be finite dimensional vectors) 
i = l, .  . .  , m  
D ,d 
S ,s 
R ,r 
G 
payload names 
design parameters (Station: number of windows, single or dual keel, number 
of bunks for the crew, size and type of power system) (Payload: volume, 
weight, ac or de) 
operations parameters (Station: number of scheduled shuttle launches, crew 
size, number of quality control inspectors, short-term reconfigurations) (Pay­
load: self-supplied power, logistics, transportation, and spare parts) 
Station resources available for users (kilowatts of power, megabytes of data, 
manpower, pressurized volume, Station provided transportation on STS) 
Growth design parameters (long-term Station additions and reconfigurations) 
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Functions (dollars are expressed in present discounted values) 
F (D ), f (d) capital costs 
F (D + G )  - F (D )  additional cost of growth 
V(D ,S ,R ), v (d ,s ,r) operations costs 
W(D ,G ,R ,S ,T) 
b (d ,s ,r) 
n (d ,s ,r )  
R = H(D ,S) '?. O
Timing 
additional operations costs due to growth where T is the date of growth, 
W = g (T){V(D + G ,S ,R ) - V(D ,S ,R )} and g (T) = (l - e-.,;) (i is the rate of in­
terest). 
payload benefits (relative to the next best use of these resources--willingness to 
pay) 
net payload benefits where n = b -f - v 
housekeeping constraint Let X (D ,S) be the gross outputs of Station resources 
produced with design D and operations parameters S .  Let h (D ,S ;K) be the 
housekeeping requirements, the resources needed to maintain that Station. 
Then H(D ,S) = X  (D ,S ) - h (D ,S ;K(D ,S )). 
resource constraint 
Decisions are implemented in a time sequence dictated by the engineering realities. The timing 
of implementation is modeled by identifying four phases of the Space Station lifecycle. 
I II III IV 
Phase Name Design Manifest Operations Growth 
Decisions to Be Made D d R ,S ,r ,s G 
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Infonnation 
One of the basic constraints faced by the organizational designer is the initial distribution of 
infonnation. If everyone knew everything necessary to make their decisions in a way that is compatible 
with organizational goals, then there would be no organizational problem. If everyone does not know 
what is necessary, then infonnation transmission is a needed first step towards desired organizational 
perfonnance. This is illustrated for the goal of efficiency on Space Station in the following table. 
INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
Decisions Made By Chooses Knows Needs to Learn 
Station Designer D ,G F JI V,n 
Station Manifester Payloads Nothing n .R  
Station Operator R ,S ,r v n 
Payload Sponsor Budgets b n ,r ,s ,d 
Payload Designer d f v ,b ,r ,s 
Payload Operator r ,s d ,v n 
Motivations 
The other constraint faced by organization designers is the behavior of the decision makers. 
This behavior (how they react to organizational changes) is predictable once we know their motivations. 
For this paper we assume that Station designers, manifesters, and operators (jointly called Station 
management) try to make decisions which further efficient design, operation, and utilization of the 
Station. 1 With respect to users, we will consider three types of motivations.
a) Efficiency
We will explicitly define efficiency below. For now we simply note that the characterization of 
user behavior as the pursuit of efficiency is meant to capture the motivations and behavior of those 
whose goals are identical to Station management (for whatever reason). Such users would, for example, 
willingly implement any action proposed by and provide any infonnation requested by Station 
management. For these users there is no incentive problem. 
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b) Net-benefit maximizers
This model is intended to capture the behavior of most non-NASA users of Space Station, 
particularly that of commercial (profit oriented) users. The model of behavior is simple and widely 
accepted among economists. If net-benefit maximizing users are assigned an allocation of Station 
resources, ri , they will then choose di and si to 
If instead they are presented with a payment schedule ti (ri ) to be paid to NASA for an amount ri of 
resources for payload i ,  they will want to choose di ,si , and ri to 
(1) 
(2) 
c) Internal users
This model is intended to capture the behavior of NASA sponsored payloads within the current 
organizational structure. It is assumed that the user is given a budget, p, for payload expenses and is 
also told they will be "rated" on the basis of how well they keep total payload costs low according to a 
performance measure c -f - v - t ,  where c is a cost target.2 It is assumed that the payload manager
cares both about the scientific benefits to be obtained from the payload and about the cost performance 
measure but not necessarily with equal fervor. An internal user will want to choose d,  s and r to 
Maximize u (b (d ,s ,r),c -f (d) - v (d ,s ,r) - t (r)) subject to f (d) + v (d ,s ,r) :::; p , (3) 
where the (utility) function u (b ,m) is intended to capture the payload manager's feelings about the 
desirability of the scientific benefits b relative to the cost performance measure m .  The function u will
be different for different managers. 
III. ENVIRONMENTS AND ANALYSIS
The optimal choice of an organization depends on the particular situation within which that 
organization is to function. The designer of the organization is presented with an information structure 
and with the motivations of the participants, neither of which he can easily alter. Given these facts, 
called the environment, the designer's task is to choose those rules of communication and allocation 
which yield desirable solutions. We illustrate this process by considering nine different examples of 
theoretical Space Station environments and a recommended organization for each. We will analyze the 
possibilities for the design of organizations (pricing and allocation rules) in the pursuit of aggregate 
efficiency in each environment Although there are fundamental conflicts between operators, 
contractors, and users of Space Station, for this paper we will assume that Space Station management, 
including designers, operators, and contractors, are in agreement with the goal of efficiency. We will 
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therefore only consider variations in the motives of the users and leave the analysis of organizational 
solutions which accomodate the realities of designer, operator, and contractor motivations to another 
paper. We will consider the three possible user motivations described earlier in the context of four 
information structures which depend primarily on what is uncertain. These four are: no uncertainty, 
Station costs uncertain, Station costs and technology uncertain, and everything (Station costs and 
technology, payload costs and payload benefits) uncertain. The key to efficient design and utilization is 
the orderly and incentive compatible3 transfer of the information from those who know to those who 
need to know. 
We will generally split the analysis into two parts: operations (phases II and III) and design
(phases I and IV). The major distinction between these two is that during operations (the short-run to 
economists), the design variable D has already been chosen and cannot be varied whereas during design 
(the long-run to economists), all decision variables can be altered. 
ENVIRONMENT A: (no uncertainty, users seek efficiency) 
In this environment (1) there is no uncertainty about the benefits, costs, or technology 
associated with the Space Station and its payloads and (2) all participants are in pursuit of the same 
goal, efficiency. We first indicate a formal problem to which this common goal is equivalent and then 
describe an incentive compatible organization which can accomplish that goal. 
Operations 
Given a collection of decisions, explicit values of D ,  R ,  S ,  and (for each i = 1 ,2,3 ,  . . . , )  ri , si ,
and di , the net life-cycle benefits of the Space Station and its payloads are calculated as 
m 
[L, bi (di ,si ,ri ) -/i (di ) - vi (di ,si ,ri )] - F (D ) - V[D ,S ,R ] . (4) 
i=l 
During operations; the value of D has already been determined; decisions can be made only on the other 
variables. Short-run efficiency in operation and utilization of the Space Station is equivalent to 
choosing R , S , r ,  s , and d to 
m 
Maximize C�: n i (di ,si ,ri )] - V (D ,S ,R )
i=l 
subject to 
R = H(D ,S) � O
and 
(5a) 
(5b) 
(5c) 
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Since everyone is assumed to want to solve this maximization problem, the organizational 
design problem is trivial. Each payload manager is told to report their true net benefit function, n i , to 
the Station management. Station management then solves the maximization problem and reports the 
appropriate values of di , ri and si to the manager of payload i who implements those choices. Under 
this scheme payload managers have an incentive to report the requested information correctly, Station 
management has all the information it needs to compute the efficient allocation, and payload managers 
have an incentive to implement the Station management's choices. 
If cost recovery is important then the Station management can also assess charges ti to each 
user where, for each i , n i - ti > O evaluated at the assigned values. They have the information they need 
to make these calculations and, since users are assumed to have the Station goals as their motivation, 
this assessment will not change behavior. 
There are also simpler organizations that would demand less information transmission and still 
perform efficiently in this environment. We will see one possibility in environment B, below. This is of 
interest since the maximization problem, we have required the Station management to solve in our 
design, may be "too large and complicated" to solve or the functions, we have asked the payload 
managers to communicate, may be too complex and difficult to describe. We do not describe these 
simpler organizations since the true Space Station environment is significantly different from that of this 
section. 
Design and Growth 
In this environment design and growth are really the same problem because of the lack of 
uncertainty. Consider phase I and the choice of D . Let N (D ) be the value of the maximum in ( 1) if D 
is the design. It is easy to show that long-run efficiency in design and operation requires that D be 
chosen to 
maximize N (D ) - F (D ) . (6) 
Thus efficiency requires "solving backwards in time" as in dynamic programming. If the organization 
described under operations is initiated prior to design decisions then it will yield long-run efficient 
decisions. If the information about N (D ) is not available design will in general not be efficient. This 
necessity, if one is interested in efficiency, to use information about plans for operations phases II and 
III to inform decisions for design in phase I will be a recurring theme throughout the rest of this paper. 
ENVIRONMENT B :  (no uncertainty, users seek net-benefits) 
In this environment (1)  there is no uncertainty about the benefits, costs, or technology 
associated with the Space Station and its payloads and (2) payload designers and operators are interested 
in the maximization of the net benefits to their own payload while contractors, designers and operators 
are in pursuit of efficiency. This differs from A only in the motivations of the users. Let us see how 
these motivations affect the performance of particular organizational designs. 
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1 .  Team 
First, reconsider the team organization in A in which the payload manager reported n , the center 
computed the efficient allocations and the payload manager implemented the decisions. It is easy to 
show, for these rules, that a payload manager motivated to maximize net benefits can do better (i.e., 
attain higher net benefits) if he reports a function other than his true one. Suppose, for example, that the 
manager of payload 1 contemplates announcing the function (1 + a.)n (d ,s ,r )  instead of n (d ,s ,r)  where 
the superscript i has been suppressed and a is some number with a =  O representing the truth. The 
Station management will then choose S (a), R (a), r 1(a.), s 1(a.), d1(a.), etc. to maximize
m 
a.n1(d1 ,s 1 ,r l) +  [:L ni (di ,si ,ri )] - V(D ,S ,R ),
i=l 
m 
subject to R = H (D ,S ) ?. 0 and :L ri 5. R  .
i=l 
It is a fairly common exercise in "comparative statics" to show that an 
1 [d 1(a.):�(a.),r 1(a.)] > o, if 
(7) 
an 1 [�] -:1; o 
. That is, 1 can raise his net benefits by overstating the benefits or understating the costs of ar 
his payload for any design, as long as he is not already at his unrestricted optimum. This incentive to 
report other than what has been requested means the organization is not incentive compatible. When all 
net-benefit maximizing managers follow this strategy then total net-benefits will be grossly overstated 
and the final resource allocations will usually not be efficient. In addition the information needed to 
make the correct Station design decisions will not be available. Overstatement of benefits will lead to a 
decision to build too large a station. The team design, which performed efficiently in environment A 
when all users were motivated by efficiency, performs inefficiently if users are net-benefit maximizers. 
(See Groves [1973] or Marshak and Radner [1972] for more details on teams.) 
2. Vickrey' s "Demand Revealing Mechanism"
One can counteract the incentive incompatibility of the team design in this environment by 
recognizing that the net-benefit maximizing payload manager will change his decisions and provide 
different information if he is charged for Station resources. Knowing this we can, through the 
appropriate choice of a "pricing policy," guide his decisions and those of the Station management 
towards efficiency in an incentive compatible fashion using an organization, first discovered by Vickrey 
[1961]. It has a particularly simple form if cost recovery is not an issue.4
3 1  
Operations 
Each user will be given an allocation r; and will then solve (1) .  Let <l>i (ri )  be the value of that 
maximum. Each user is asked to report the entire function <l>i ( ) to the Station management The 
Station accepts these reports as correct and chooses the allocation r and Station variables R and S to 
solve 
m m 
Maximize C�: <l>i (ri )] - L (D ,'L ri), where
i=l i=l
L (D ,R )  = Min V [D ,S ,R ], subject to R = H (D ,S ) .s 
n 
(8) 
(9) 
The Station charges each user ti = L (D ,'L r;) - 'L<I>i(ri) evaluated at the solution to (8) and (9). Under
i=l i=l j¢i 
these rules short-run efficiency (given the design D )  will occur in one iteration since it is an optimal 
response for net-benefit maximizing users to send their true net-benefit functions no matter what the 
other users do because the charge depends on their infonnation only through the choice of R and r .  5
One major drawback is the possibility that the functions <l> are too complex to describe. We are 
currently conducting reseach on an iterative version of this mechanism, requiring simpler point 
messages, and its applicability for deciding manifesting and operating allocations in environments even 
closer to that of the Space Station than in this section. (This experimental environment is detailed in 
Banks, Ledyard and Porter [1985a]). Another drawback is that there is a potential financial problem 
with the Vickrey rules, since each user receives an amount almost equal to the aggregate net- benefits of 
the project. One can avoid this without destroying incentives through the use of lump-sum transfers. 
m m 
Let t*i = ti + max{['L <I>i (ri)] - L  (D •L ri)} and note that the tenn added to t does not depend on i 's
r j=l j=l 
j# j¢i 
infonnation, <l>; . If users are charged t * , tax revenues will be positive and incentives will not be 
affected. 
Design 
The Vickrey mechanism can be easily adapted to the design phase by choosing D and S to
solve 
L * (R ) = min F (D )  + V(D ,S,R ), subject to R = H (D ,S ) . 
D .S  
(10) 
and then substituting the long-run cost function L * for the short-run cost function L in the computation 
of the tax t or t* . If the mechanism is instituted during phase I and if the users' infonnation, <l>, is used 
as in (8), (9), and ( 10), then long-run efficient design, operation, and utilization will result in this 
environment. 
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3. Posted Prices (marginal cost pricing)
If there are a large number of potential users, each of whom will not be a major consumer of 
Station resources, then one may be able to produce an approximately efficient allocation of resources 
with a more traditional and familiar pricing structure. In this form of organization the Station 
management posts a price, p , per unit for use of Station resources and then states it will charge each 
user ti (y i ) = p/ . The payload manager then reports his desired resource use, ri , to the Station
m 
management which adds up the requests to compute R = I: r i ,  the aggregate demand at those prices. At 
i=l
this point, many variations are possible. We consider three possibilities under the assumption that users 
believe they cannot affect prices .  
Operations 
Remember (short-run) efficiency is equivalent to solving problem (5). Since users will choose 
ri to solve (2), it must be true that an� = p .  Therefore, for r and R to solve (5) it must be true that ar1 
p = aL � ,R. ) when L is evaluated at the stated demands at these prices. 6 It would be a remarkable 
stroke of luck if prices chosen arbitrarily led to demands which satisfied this property. One must, 
therefore, either design the organizational structure either to generate posted prices appropriate for 
efficiency or else be prepared to allocate resources to users in a pattern which is different than they 
requested. 
One organization that will not ration resources efficiently is a committee. B ecause users have 
no real incentives (remember they are net benefit maximizing users) to provide such a committee with 
accurate information on the relative costs and benefits of any changes in the assigned resources, the 
committee will be only able to use criteria such as "find the best fit" or "first-come, first-served." If users 
know that this is to be the method of resource allocation then their demands at the posted prices will not 
solve (2). For example, if fitting is to be the criteria then users will create smaller than efficient 
payloads. This natural response by users has, for example, created excess demand for middeck volume 
on Shuttles. Although there are no known general results, efficiencies of only 50-60% have usually 
occured in experimental "test bed" analyses of this type of organization. 
If it is relatively easy to reconfigure the Station design and if the cost structure is linear (i.e., if 
a2L
2 = O V R ), then there is a standard solution to the organizational design problem (see, e.g., TomanaR 
and Macauley [1986]). Given R and D ,  reconfigure the station by picking G to solve 
Minimize L (D + G ,R. ) - F (D + G ) ( 1 1) 
where L is given by (9). Under our assumptions, from section II, if D' = D + G is the solution to (1 1) 
then D' solves (10). If prices are chosen initially so p = aL ;�R ) (long-run marginal costs), and if G is
set to solve (1 1) then this organization will perform efficiently in both the short-run and long-run. The 
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proof is not too difficult to follow once one recognizes that these organizational rules "create" the 
appropriate first-order conditions. Taking prices as given, the payload users will solve (2) and choose ,;  
to solve an'. = p . Since p = aL ;�R ) it follows that the allocation r satisfies the first order conditions ar' 
for (5).7 
If it is not easy to reconfigure the Station, which seems to be more likely or if costs are not 
linear in R ,  which seems to be true, then flexible prices are a necessity during operations if efficient 
utilization is desired. Given a design D and given that growth cannot be immediately implemented, we 
know from above that efficiency requires prices be equal to short-run marginal cost, aL�,R ) , 
evaluated at the quantities demanded at those prices. 8 To achieve that equality by choosing the correct
allocations, iteration of information is necessary between users, who will choose r and s ,  and Station 
operators, who will choose R and S . That is, Station management must post prices, users return 
demands, management post new prices, and so on until an equilibrium is found. Without such iteration, 
posted pricing will result in less than efficient operation and utilization. 
Design 
If marginal costs are constant for all R then the original design choices D in phase I could have 
been made in the same way that G was above. That is, Station management posts marginal cost prices 
(which can be calculated independently of R because of the linearity), gets users' demands at those 
prices, then chooses G as in (11)  with D = O. Only one iteration is necessary and there would be no need 
to readjust designs later.9 
If marginal costs are not constant then, as in the operations phases, iteration is necessary if 
efficiency is to be achieved. Management posts prices. Users compute r .  Management calculates 
R = � ,; and then calculates D using (10). Management then posts new prices with p = aL ;�R) . This 
1=1 
continues until no revisions in p or r are desired. In the steady state this organization, called long-run 
marginal cost pricing, performs efficiently if users always state their demands for r under the 
assumption that prices will not change and that they cannot affect the prices. 10 If stopped prior to 
achieving a steady state, marginal cost pricing performs less than efficiently. 
ENVIRONMENT C: (no uncertainty, users seek benefits) 
In this environment: (1) there is no uncertainty about the benefits, costs, or technology 
associated with the Space Station and its payloads, and (2) payload designers and operators are 
interested in the maximization of the benefits to their own payload, tempered somewhat by cost 
considerations, while all others are in pursuit of efficiency. This differs from A and B only in the
incentives of the users. 
One immediate implication of these motivations is that there is no organization which will 
perform efficiently. A manager who behaves according to (3) will choose his decisions to satisfy 
aui ab j + au j _El!_ _ avj - ')./ El!_ + avj = 0 < abi )( adj ) < acj )£ adj adj 1 < )£ adj adj 1
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( au'. )( ab'. ) + ( au'. )( av'. ) - (J./ )[ av'. J = O and db' dS1 de1 dS1 dS1 
( au'. )( ab'. ) + ( au'. )[- av'. _ at'. ] - (A! X av'. ) = O 
db' dr1 de1 dr1 dr1 ar1 
where /./ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with his budget constraints. For efficiency it is
required that 
ab'. _ � - av'. = O 
ad' ad' ad' 
dbi dVi -. - -. = 0, and dS1 dS1 
Thus efficiency will obtain under (12) if and only if both �i and e i ,  as well as the pricing rule ti , are 
chosen for each i such that 
au'. = au'. + ').} and dt'. = ( aL ) [( au'. )/( au'. )] .ab' ae1 dr' aR ab' ae1 
( 12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
Unless ( ��; )/( ��; ) is the same for all payload managers across all possible payload designs and 
operations, which is highly unlikely, each user must be subjected to a different pricing rule to achieve 
efficient utilization. Further, that rule must depend explicitly on i 's utility function, the value of which 
is known only to i and not to Station management. It is my conjecture that it is impossible to design an
organization that provides the appropriate incentives to payload designers, with motivations described 
by (3), to transfer their information to Station management in a way that efficiency results. 
It is true that if we redefine efficiency to include the preferences of the payload managers then 
we can find organizations that do the job, but I do not think it is correct to approach the problem in that 
way. The motivations described by (3) were intended to capture the behavior of an internal NASA 
payload manager who represents Congress. It is therefore the preferences of Congress that should be 
used in evaluating efficiency, not the preferences of their representatives. Those preferences are net­
benefit maximizing for each payload if Congress wants to maximize the benefits to science from its total 
expenditures. Therefore, rather than redefining efficiency, the correct approach would be to change the 
internal operating procedures of NASA by changing the incentives and opportunities faced by payload 
managers. With a change in their motivations, one would then have some hope of efficiently designing 
and utilizing Space Station. 1 1  
Since efficiency seems to be impossible to achieve if payload managers are motivated primarily 
by benefits and are able to ignore costs, I will not analyze environments with these motivations again in 
this paper. Instead let me tum to the influence of information and uncertainty on the choice of an 
3S 
organization. 
ENVIRONMENT D: (costs uncertain, users seek efficiency) 
In this environment: (1) there is no uncertainty about payload net- benefits or Station 
technology but there is uncertainty about the costs of Station design and operations, and (2) payload 
designers and operators and Station management are assumed to be in pursuit of efficiency. This differs 
from A only in the knowledge about costs. 
The easiest way to model uncertainty is to assume the existence of a random variable, w .  This 
variable represents the complete state of the world and may only be partially known by some of the 
agents. w has a density function n(w) which represents all participants' common knowledge and beliefs. 
Station costs are now represented by letting capital costs be F (D ,w) and operating costs be V (D ,R ,S ,w ) . 
Every other function remains the same. 
One of the complications created by uncertainty is that time is now important. In particular, we 
must keep track of the time at which new information is learned, since actions taken before that time 
cannot depend on that information while actions taken later can. Decisions can, however, be made 
contingent on information before it is known. This fact will be very important as we proceed. Although 
more generality is possible, for ease of exposition I will assume that decisions are made in two periods: 
today and tomorrow. Today, design parameters D and d; will be chosen. Tomorrow w will be known to
the Station management, but no one else, and R , S ,  r and s will be chosen. This means that the 
decisions made tomorrow can depend on the value of w . 12
Because of the inclusion of uncertainty we need to revise our formalization of efficiency. 
Characterizations like (S) are no longer valid. The correct approach follows from dynamic 
programming and solves the maximization of "expected" net benefits "backwards." To see how this 
works suppose that it is tomorrow. D and d will have already been chosen, w will be known, and it is 
now time to choose R , S ,  r and s .  The realized (present discounted value) of net benefits to be received
from any such choices can be calculated as 
m 
P (D ,R .,S ,d,r ,s ,w) = C�: n; (di ,r; ,si)] - F (D  ,w ) - V(D .,S ,R ,w ) . (lS) 
i=l 
Efficiency requires the choices of R ,  S ,  r and s be made to maximize (lS) subject to (Sb) and (Sc). This
yields a decision rule for R = R (D ,d ,w ) and similar decision rules for the other variables. Let the value
of the solution to that maximization be p• (D ,d ,w). Now return to the decisions today. D and d must
be chosen before w is known. This is a decision under uncertainty and, while there are many models of 
such decisionmaking, I will make the common assumption that all decisionmakers are risk-neutral, 
expected utility maximizers. This implies that efficiency is equivalent to the maximization of expected 
net-benefits. 13 Thus, long-run efficiency requires the choices of D and d to
maximize f P * (D ,d ,w )n(w )dw . (16) 
In effect, the efficiency problem can be solved completely today through a choice of decisions D and d 
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and of decision rules for R , S ,  s and r contingent on w. The implementation of that solution involves 
doing D and d today, observing w tomorrow, and then following the appropriate actions as specified in 
the decision rules. 
If there are no capacity constraints on information processing, then the organizational design 
solution for this environment is effectively the same as that in environment A, the team. Users submit 
the functions ni to Station management who then solve (15) and (16), and report the designs, di , to the 
users. After w is observed then users are told si (w) and ri (w ) . Since the users are motivated to pursue 
efficiency they have an incentive to provide the requested information and to abide by the solution of 
the Station management who fully use the information provided in their choice of design, D .  
If it is difficult or impossible to process the information transfers required by this team 
mechanism, then other, perhaps iterative, organizational designs must be considered. One possibility is 
described in the next section and two more possibilities are presented in the section covering 
environment G below.14 Those discussions assume that users are net-benefit maximizing. But even if
they are efficiency-seeking users, the Station management need merely tell them to act as if they are 
net-benefit maximizing (transactions can be implicit rather than explicit). If efficiency- seeking users 
accept the fact that following that prescribed behavior indeed creates efficient design and utilization, 
they will do so. This has the added attraction that it can deal with situations in which some users seek 
efficiency and some seek net-benefits. 
ENVIRONMENT E: (cost uncertainty, users seek net-benefits) 
In this environment: (1) there is no uncertainty about payload net- benefits or Station 
technology but there is uncertainty about the costs of Station design and operations, and (2) payload 
designers and operators are interested in the maximization of the net benefits to their payload while 
Station management is in pursuit of efficiency. This differs from environment B only in the knowledge 
about costs and from environment E only in motivations. 
A first attempt at organizational design for this environment might be to modify marginal cost 
pricing. Can one, for example, post a price today to be paid for the resources to be consumed tomorrow, 
design to the planned demand given that price, and end up with an efficient allocation? We will show 
that the answer is yes if and only if the operating cost function V(D,S,R,w) has an additional property 
beyond those required under certainty. Begin with the natural way to define marginal costs under 
uncertainty using the minimum expected life-cycle cost of supplying R , defined as
E (R ) = min f[F (D ,w) + V(D .,S ,w))]1t(w)dw , subject to R =H [D .,S] .
D ,S  
(17) 
Now consider the following organizational design. Station management posts expected long-run 
marginal costs as prices by letting p = a��) . User i then chooses di and plans ri and si to maximize
m 
{n i - pri }. Station management then sets R = L ri , chooses D and plans for S to solve (17) and 
i=l 
recomputes prices p .  This process continues until it converges to a steady state. (Remember, as under 
certainty, iteration will be necessary unless the cost function E (R ) is linear inR in which case 
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convergence occurs in one iteration.) 
This organization will perfonn efficiently only under certain conditions. To see what these 
conditions are, let us again work backwards. Once w is known, efficiency requires the maximization of 
(lS) subject to (Sb) and (Sc). It is easy to see that this may require that R ,  S ,  s and r to have different 
values depending on the realization of w .  However, in the calculation of the prices p ,  the plans for R
were independent of w .  Consulting ( 17) one can see that the value of S must then also be independent 
of w since D is. Therefore, the values of r and s generated by the expected LRMC pricing organization 
must also not depend on w .  The only hope that expected marginal cost pricing is efficient, therefore, is 
if the efficient allocation tomorrow is independent of w ;  that is, if 
()2V (D ,S ,R ,w ) = d2V(D ,S ,R ,w) = O 15
()R ()w as aw 
. (18) 
If ( 1 8) is true, then (expected) marginal cost pricing perfonns in this environment in the same 
way that marginal cost pricing did in environment B .  If (18) is not true, then under (expected) marginal 
cost pricing, after w is learned, there will usually be advantageous reallocations which users will be 
unable to make. One way to fix this would be to allow prices to change, or to implement some other 
fonn of rationing and allocation, tomorrow when w is known. But then one has a different organization 
and users will, in the process of providing infonnation today, take these future rationings into account. 
We will consider some possibilities under environment G. 
ENVIRONMENT F: (cost and technology uncertain, users seek efficiency) 
In this environment: (1) there is no uncertainty about payload net-benefits but there is 
uncertainty about the costs and the technology, and (2) all are in pursuit of efficiency. This differs from 
environment D only in the knowledge about technology. 
We model this fonn of uncertainty in exactly the same way we did in the previous section, with 
a random variable x .  Now, however, it is also the relationship between the Station parameters and the 
supply of services to users that is uncertain. This can be due to lack of knowledge about the actual 
technical relationships or due to an uncertain reliability in the demands of the Station itself on the 
resources it produces. Let R = H (D ,S ,x) represent this uncertainty as it exists today.16 Costs will also 
depend17 on x ,  represented as F (D ,x) and V(D ,S ,R ,x). We let µ(x) be the density function on x which 
is assumed to be known to Station management. Tomorrow, x will be known to Station operators.18  
We must redefine expected net benefit maximization to correspond with efficiency for this 
environment. As in the previous section, the problem is solved backwards. Tomorrow, given D and d 
and having observed x ,  the (short-run) efficient Station and payload decisions, R ,  S ,  r and s solve
m m 
maximize c�: nj (dj ,sj ,ri )] - F (D ,x ) - V(D ,s ,R ,x) subject to R = H [D ,s ,x] and L ri 5:.R . (19) 
i=l i=l 
Let Q (D ,d ,x )  represent the value of the solution to (19).  Using the same model for decisions under 
uncertainty as above, the (long-run) efficient decisions D ,  d ,  and decision rules S (x ),R (x ),r (x ),s (x )
solve (18) for each x as well as 
maximize f Q (D ,d ,X )µ(X )dX .
38 
(20) 
Again, as in environment D , if there are no information processing capacity constraints and if 
there are efficiency-seeking users, we need only request that users send the entire function n (d ,s ,r ) to 
the Station management who then can solve (19) and (20).19 If there are capacity constraints, then one 
can mimic the organizations in the next section by asking efficiency seekers to act as if they are net­
benefit maximizers. 
ENVIRONMENT G: (uncertain cost and technology, users seek net-benefits) 
In this environment: (1) there is no uncertainty about payload net-benefits but there is 
uncertainty about the costs and the technology, and, (2) payload designers and operators are interested 
in the maximization of the net benefits to their payload while all others are in pursuit of efficiency. This 
differs from D only in the knowledge about technology and from F only in the motivations of users. 
Expected long-run marginal cost pricing, as described in the last section, will not perform 
efficiently in this environment--either in the short-run or the long-run--since it does not allow the 
flexibility in planning needed to prepare for the various possibilities tomorrow. To see this most easily 
let us consider the special case in which there are no possible reconfigurations and operating parameters 
can not be varied. In particular, S (x) = s (x) = 0 for all x .  Then when prices p are posted, users choose d
and r where r (x) = r is constant for all x .  Tomorrow, x is observed, resources available are 
R (x) = H (D .x) and demand is D leaving an amount of D -R (x) to ration in some way. Let o(r ,l:;r ,R )
be the probability that i gets r if the combined orders are l:;r and the supply is R . i will then choose r 
and d to maximize fo<r .l:;r ,R (x))[n (d ,r) -pr]µ(x)dx . If o is decreasing in r (i.e., larger payloads have a
larger chance of being curtailed or rationed), then each i will order a smaller value of r than they would
if they knew r would be delivered with certainty. (The proof easily follows from the first order
conditons.) Inefficiencies result. There are, however, at least two other ways to organize to achieve 
higher efficiency in this environment. 
1 .  Full contingent pricing 
This organization is a natural extension of the marginal cost pricing institution described earlier 
and is created by introducing a broader set of contracts. One presents a menu of prices, 
p (l),p (2), . . .  ,p (x), . . . , one for each commodity in each possible state, or realization of x .  Payment of
the price P1c (x) entitles the user to receive one unit of resource k tomorrow if and only if state x obtains.
Economists call this a contingent contract, the classic example of which is an insurance contract. 
Each expected net-benefit maximizing, risk-neutral, price-taking user will try to choose a design 
choice di , a set of contingent contracts ri (1), . . .  , ri (x ), . . .  , at the prices p (1),p (2), . . . , and contingent 
plans for si (l), . . .  , si (x ), . . .  , to maximize
f n i [di ,si (x ),ri (x )]µ(x )dx - fp (x )ri (x )dx . (21) 
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The probability density is missing from the second integral since p (x )r (x) is paid for each x whether x 
occurs or not If there are only a finite number of possible x then that integral, and all others over x ,  are 
really summations20 over x .  
Operations 
During operations, D and d have been chosen and cannot be altered, but x is known. Since
there is no uncertainty at this point we can forget contingent contracts. We already know, from our 
analysis for environment A , that if users choose r and s to
(22) 
if they report r i  to the Station management, if Station management computes R = Di and chooses S to 
minimize V[D ,S ,R .x] subject to H[D ,S.x] =R � O . (23) 
and if p • = o<I>(�: ,R ) where <I>( ) is the solution to (23), then the allocations r and R and the 
operations parameters S and s will be (short-run) efficient/or each x for a given D . As we will see
below, if contingent markets are used during manifesting and operations planning and if the correct 
prices are posted for these contingent contracts, then the prices which will generate short-run efficiency 
during operations will be easy to calculate. In particular, if p (l),p (2), . . .  ,p(x), . . .  , are the equilibrium 
contingency prices (defined in the next section on manifesting), and, once x is observed, if 
p • = p (x )/µ(x) then allocations and operations parameters chosen according to (22) and (23) will satisfy
• o<I>(D .x ,R ) p = 'OR .
If planning is incomplete and prices do not equal short-run marginal cost in x ,  evaluated at the 
demands at those prices, then either the demands r cannot be filled or the operations parameters are 
inefficient. In either case one must then resort to an ad hoc rationing procedure (such as the working 
groups on Spacelab), accepting lower than possible efficiencies and wasting time and effort 
recalculating allocations, or one must recalulate prices and iterate between payload designers and 
Station management, again wasting effort and time, until one settles on a steady state. Both alternatives 
would be better avoided. 
Manifesting 
By careful and timely planning during manifesting, using benefit and demand information in a 
sytematic fashion, one can significantly improve efficiency and simultaneously avoid the need for 
extensive reallocations or pricing iterations during operations. We now tum to a design that organizes 
planning during phase II, after the Station design parameters D have been chosen but before x is known
and before all other decisions have been made. 
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Contingent contracts are offered to users at prices p (l),p (2), . . .  ,p(x), . . .  , Users choose d and 
plans for s (x) and r (x) to maximize (21). They report these contingent demands to Station management 
who compute R (x ). They then choose plans S (x) to solve (23) with R = R (x ). If
p (x) = ( o<l>[�:C� (x )] )(µ(x )) for each x then the demands of the users are consistent with the plans of
the Station management. If not, then price adjustments, iterations between Station management and 
users, will be necessary if efficiency is desired. 
In a steady state, the utilization and operation of payloads and Station as well as the design of 
the payloads will be as efficient as possible given the design of the Station. This improves on the 
efficiency obtained above during operations by guiding the design of payloads towards utilization of 
more reliable resources and encouraging flexibility. Further, the plans r (x ), s (x), S (x) and R (x),
determined prior to knowing the actual realization of x are exactly those decisions indicated by efficient
operation in the previous section after x is known. Therefore, if manifesting is done with contingent 
contracts and if prices of these contingent contracts are allowed to adjust in response to demand 
information generated by those prices, then no new decisions will be necessary during operations. One 
simply observes x and then implements the appropriate planned actions. No unanticipated reallocations 
will be needed in this environment. 
Design · 
If we want to achieve long-nm efficiency and if growth is difficult or impossible, the Station
design must incorporate information from manifesting and operations plans. If the contingent markets 
described above are available prior to the choice of D , during phase I, then full efficiency is possible.
As before, we can show that if Station management, having been given the users' contingent 
requirements r (x) for each x ,  plans operations S (x) to solve (23) given R (x) and chooses the design D
to 
minimize J {F (D ,X) + <l>(D ,R (x ).x )}µ(x )dx , (24) 
posts prices p (x) = ( o<l>[�:C� (x )] )(µ(x )) and if users choose designs and operations plans to maximize
(21), and if both implement tomorrow the action specified by these contingent contracts, then in a 
steady state design choices today and implemented actions tomorrow will be (long-nm) efficient.21 The
availability of contingent demand information allows the Station to be designed with the appropriate 
flexibility so that operations can adjust efficiently to information to be learned tomorrow. The 
availability of contingent contracts allows the same planning and flexibility for users. More bang for 
the buck is the result. 
The primary drawback of this organization is that all contingencies must be priced. It is usually 
very difficult in practice to list all possibilities22 in sufficient detail, and if the full set of contingencies is
not specified, user plans will not be efficient Evaluating the trade-off between the costs of planning for 
a large number of contingencies and the efficiency losses from planning for only a small number of 
contingencies is an empirical question. 
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Another drawback is  the necessity that the true state of the world, x, be mutually verifiable after 
it occurs. Both parties to the contract must be able to agree which contingency has actually occurred.23 
If they cannot, the contracts are meaningless. 
Both drawbacks are reasons why full contingent pricing is rare in practice although partial
contingent pricing is common. For example one can imagine writing contracts for delivery of Station 
resources contingent only on the availability of those resources. Such a system of contracts is 
considered next. 
2. Priority pricing
If the major uncertainty is about the amounts of resources available in each state, there is an 
alternative to full contingency contracting which can produce efficiency with a simpler set of contracts,
called priority contracts. Priorities are numbers c:x = 1 ,2,3, . . .  , assigned to resource allocations which 
are then priced differentially according to the priority with which they are to be delivered. Simplicity 
occurs partly because no explicit descriptions of the various states, x ,  are necessary. While there are 
many variations depending on the timing of the collection of the payments, we consider only one. For 
each commodity k ,  a price of Pk (c:x) is to be paid to order one unit of that commodity with priority c:x,
whether the resource is delivered or not. The payment of Pk ( c:x) entitles the user to receive one unit of 
commodity k if and only if that unit is available after all users with priority numbers less than c:x have 
first been supplied (i.e., contingent on the supply being large enough to fill demands of those who have 
paid for earlier priorities). 
In this organization, each user will be allocated quantities qi (1), qi (2), . . .  , where qi (c:x) is the 
a 
amount of resource to be delivered to i with priority c:x. We let Qi (c:x) = I:  l U) be i 's total quantity 
J=l 
assigned a priority of a or better. To evaluate qi , i must have beliefs about the reliability of each 
priority class. Reliabilities are determined jointly by the suppliers, Station management, and the 
demanders, payload operators and designers, as follows. Station management provides an uncertain 
supply of resources (because H depends on x ). Let cr(Q ) be the probability that the supply available for 
m 
users, after housekeeping, is greater than or equal to Q .  If Q (ex) = I: Qi (c:x), then 
i=l 
(25) 
where the last term assumes random rationing if shortages occur within a priority class. We assume that 
users believe they cannot individually directly affect �· An expected net-benefit maximizing risk-neutral 
user will try to choose di , contract for qi and plan for si to solve 
maximize I;o(c:x)[ni (di ,si (c:x),Qi (c:x)) -f i (di) - vi (di ,s; (c:x),Q ; (c:x))] (26) 
a 
where o(c:x) = �(c:x) - �(c:x + 1) is the probability that only priorities 1, • . .  , c:x will be filled (c:x may only be
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partially filled) and si (a) is i 's planned operations parameters if only 1, . . .  , a are filled. In a steady
state given supply uncertainty o'(Q ) and prices P (a), the values for p,d ,s and q simultaneously satisfy 
(25) for each i and (24).
Operations 
If priority contracts were used in planning during manifesting, and prices were correctly 
determined, then operations are easy and can be managed by observing x ,  determining the available 
resources R (x ), and then allocating R (x) to users in order of their self-selected priority. Letting r (a) be 
the amounts contracted at priority a, r (l) will be supplied first, r (2) supplied second and so it goes until 
there is no more of R (x) to allocate. 
If, during manifesting, prices are incorrectly set or priority contracts are not fully utilized then 
operations must be managed as in contingent markets. Since x is known, efficiency requires that a price 
be chosen equal to short-run marginal cost at those demands. 
Manifesting 
Some of the advantages of priority contracts occur in this phase. Prices paid for each priority 
must be flexible and responsive to benefit (demand) information. Given a vector of priority prices 
p (1), . . .  ,p (a), . . . , and an uncertain supply cr(Q ), users choose d ,q ,s to maximize (26). These choices
also determine reliabilities p(a). Users report their priority demands qi to Station management which
computes Q (a) = L l (a), minimizes the life-cycle costs of supplying Q and p, and recomputes the
prices to reflect marginal costs of those demands. Formally they choose plans for S and R , contingent 
on x ,  to solve 
minimize JV (D ,S (x ),R (x ),x )d µ(x)
subject to R (x) = H(D ,S (x),s ) and 
_ > J R (x) - Q (a - 1) p(a) - µ[{x I R (x) - Q (a)}] + Q (  ) - Q (  - l) dµ(x) . {x l Q (a� (x)�Q (a-1)} a <l 
(27) 
This requires station management to produce the uncertain supply to satisfy (in a least cost way) the 
preferences for reliability revealed by users in their choices of q and p. Given these Station
management plans, there is a new uncertain supply with cr(Q ) = µ( {x I R (x) ;;::: Q }  ). Let c* [D ,p(-),Q OJ 
be the value of the solution to (27). If Station management computes new priority prices using the 
rule24 
p (a) - p (a + 1) = ac* /()Q (a) (28) 
then, in a steady state, the allocation of resources will be as efficient as possible given the fixed number 
of priority classes. That is, the steady-state values of payload and station plans d ,s ,r ,S ,R. and 
reliabilities PC-) satisfy (19) and (20). 
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It is possible that the number of classes required for full efficiency is relatively small. For 
example, if supply is modular and lumpy then a small finite number of classes is sufficient. As an 
example, on STS trips to orbit, either the entire bay goes or it doesn't. With four orbiters able to fly a 
maximum of, say, four trips per year each there will be at most 16 trips. Further, the capacities per trip 
will be a constant R times one of 0, 1,2, . . .  , 15 or 16. Therefore, one needs at most 17 priority classes
(per year) to achieve efficiency. A similar calculation can be made for manpower or power (the latter 
occurring in modular units of 5 kws). If one is willing to accept less than fully efficient performance 
from an organization then fewer priority classes are sufficient. While it is primarily an empirical issue, 
on a case by case basis, it is my conjecture that a sizeable portion of the efficiency gains (over a single 
price policy like expected marginal cost pricing) can be achieved with two to four classes. 
Design 
As with contingent contracts, long-run efficiency requires design decisions to be guided by 
information available in the plans for manifesting and operations. In particular, if the priority 
contracting process is begun during phase 1 and if, when presented with priority demands Q (-) and 
reliabilities PO, Station management also chooses the Station design D to 
minimize c• (D ,Q ('),PO) (29) 
prior to recomputing prices, where c* is the value of (27), then designs and resource allocations will be
long-run efficient (in a steady state). Further, when x is observed and R (x) becomes known, no further 
reallocation process is needed. Whatever resources are available need only be distributed according to 
the already self- selected priorities. Careful, systematic planning using incentive compatible rules can 
produce efficient design and utilization in this environment and minimize re-allocations. 
There is one class of environments, however, in which there can never be enough classes to 
allow priority pricing to achieve 100% efficiency. We turn to that now. 
ENVIRONMENT H: (everything uncertain, users seek efficiency) 
In this environment: (1)  there is uncertainty about payload net-benefits, costs and technology, 
and (2) all agents are in pursuit of efficiency. This differs from environment F only in the knowledge 
about payload net benefits. 
We model this form of uncertainty in exactly the same way we did in the previous section, with 
a random variable x .  Now, however, it is also the net benefits to be attained by payloads from the 
utilization of Station resources that is uncertain. This includes uncertainty about the ultimate payoff 
from the scientific or commercial output of the payload, about the level of costs needed to operate the 
payload, or about the design and construction costs of the payload. It is important to realize that the
timing of the resolution of the uncertainty is also crucial. If the uncertainty is resolved only after the 
operation of the payload, then the situation is effectively the same as in environment F with the net 
benefit functions replaced by their expected value. If, however, payload designers will learn anything 
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helpful between the time they must begin to provide information, or make decisions, and the time they 
finish consuming resources then some new analysis is needed. Each net benefit function is now also a 
function of the random variable x and is written as n i (d ,s ,r ,x ). This formulation, in which x does not 
have a superscript, does not mean that each i will know what every other payload manager knows. For 
example, n ; may depend only on one of the dimensions of x .
Again, we redefine net benefit maximization to correspond with efficiency in this new 
environment by working backwards. Tomorrow, given D and d and having observed x ,  the (short-run) 
efficient decisions for R , r ,  s and S solve 
maximize [,DJ i [di ,s; (x ),ri (x ),x ]] - V (D ,S (x ),R (x ),x)
j 
subject to L r; (x) s; R (x ); R (x) = H (D ,S (x ),x) � 0. Let J (D ,d ,x)  be the value of the solution to this 
j 
(30) 
problem. The (long-run) efficient decisons for D ,  d ,  R (x ), r (x ), S (x) and s (x) satisfy (30) for each x as
well as 
maximize J [J (D ,d ,x)
-
F (D ,x )]µ(x )dx . (31) 
As in environments D and F, if there are no information processing constraints and if all users 
are efficiency seekers, then one organization that achieves efficiency is easy to describe. Each user is 
told to inform Station management about the function n • (r ,x) = max n (d ,s ,r ,x ) . The major difference 
d,s 
between this environomet and previous ones is that now users must be able to describe the net-benefits 
they may receive in all relevant conceivable states x. This is clearly a more complicated task than the 
previous requests required. If this is too complicated then one solution is to use the organization to be 
detailed in the next section, and tell each efficiency seeker to act as if they are a net-benefit maximizer. 
That organization requires less information transfer at a time. 
ENVIRONMENT I: (everything uncertain, users seek net-benefit) 
In this environment: (1)  there is uncertainty about payload benefits, costs and technology, and 
(2) payload designers and operators are interested in the maximization of the net benenfits to their 
payload while Station management is in pursuit of efficiency. This differs from environment H only in 
the motivations of the users. 
Priority pricing, as described in environment G, will not perform efficiently in this environment 
since it does not allow the flexibility in planning needed to prepare for the variations in information 
faced by users. This is because priority contracts depend only on the availability of resources on Station 
and not on the variations in information about costs and benefits to users. On the other hand, full 
contingent pricing can perform efficiently if all the relevant information to be learned by the users is 
mutually verifiable by both user and Station management. The analysis is a straight-forward 
generalization of that presented for environment G and need not be presented here. The main 
observation from such an exercise is that the number of contingency contracts is large and verification 
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difficult. 
If one wants to preserve the simplicity of priority contracts but still achieve the efficiency of 
full-contingent pricing, there is a hybrid structure that can do the job. One can use priority markets, for 
planning, and after-markets (spot markets), to deal with the reallocations that are necessary to yield 
efficient allocations after users learn, if expectations are rational. This organization is identical to 
priority pricing as described for environment G, with one addition. After x is observed each user is 
allowed to trade with other users or the Station (in much the same way that trades occured on Spacelab 
after manifesting and during operations in orbit). Such trading can occur in an organized manner 
through a market or in an unorganized manner through face-to-face bilateral or multilateral trades. It 
can be proven that if all mutually beneficial trades are completed after x occurs and if, before x occurs,
users and Station management form their expectations about trades in a rational manner, then priority 
pricing will perform efficiently. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have considered a sequence of successively complicated environments to illustrate that 
systematic organizational design depends on the goals of the organization and the environment in which 
that organization is to operate. Environment I is the closest to that faced by Space Station and the 
recommended organizational structure (assuming efficient design, operation, and utilization is the goal) 
is a combination of priority pricing with an after-market The entire list of recommendations follows. 
ENVIRONMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRICING POLICIES 
What is Users Recommended 
Uncertain Motivations Organization 
A Nothing Efficiency Team 
B Nothing Net Benefits MCPricing, Vickrey 
c Nothing Benefits ???? 
D Costs Efficiency Team,ExMCPricing 
E Costs Net Benefits ExMCPricing 
F Costs & Technology Efficiency Team ,Priority 
G Costs & Technology Net Benefits Priority pricing 
H Everything Efficiency Team,Priority 
I Everything Net Benefits Priority w/after-markets 
We can now see how the remarks made in the main body of the paper relate to the analysis in 
the appendix. The team structure is recommended in environments A,D,F and H. The common threads 
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are the mutuality of interests of users and Station Management (known and shared goals) and the 
unrestricted information processing capacity. In these environments there are neither incentive nor 
information problems. Marginal cost based pricing is recommended in environments B ,D and E. The 
common threads are no benefit or technology uncertainty (stable resource supply) and verifiable cost 
data (accurate cost information). We further found that posting prices was valid only when there was a 
linear cost structure and the project was easy to expand. Finally, priority pricing is recommended for 
environments F,G,H and I. The common threads for these are the uncertain technology (random 
supply) and accurate reliability information. We further saw that modular design led to fewer priority 
classes being necessary. 
The importance of the list for policy analysis is not just that the ideal is attainable but that the 
organizational structure must be tailored to the environment and not vice versa. Just as one should not 
expect an oxygen consuming plane to be able to service sattelites or the STS to shuttle passengers from 
New York to Washington D.C. efficiently, one should not expect one organization to be able to perform 
effectively in all environments. NASA should not try to force the management of the Space Station to 
conform to the structure which was successful for the Apollo program; rather, the management structure 
of NASA should be altered to fit the requirements and goals of the Space Station program. 
Inappropriate management, embodied in inappropriate pricing and allocation policies, can cause 
performance to be significantly less than it might be. Evidence from the STS program certainly 
supports this hypothesis. 
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* This paper was invited and written for the Symposium on Explorations in Space Policy: Emerging
Economic and Technical Issues, sponsored by the National Academy of Engineering and
Resources for the Future on June 24-25, 1986. Much of the research for this paper, the details of
which can be found in the referenced JPL working papers, was funded by NASA through JPL.
They bear absolutely no responsibility for any of my conclusions. This paper was significantly 
improved with the help of comments from Jeffrey Banks, Peter Gray, Hamid Habib-Agahi, Molly 
Macauley and especially David Porter. They also bear no responsibility for its contents.
1 .  In reality their motivations are more complex and involve interactions with Congress and private 
contractors. A careful analysis of those motivations would require another paper. 
2. I have omitted the superscript i on all functions and variables.
3. "Incentive compatible" means that all participants willingly and accurately comply with the
demands of the organization for infonnation and actions. If an organization is incentive
compatible, the incentives participants face are compatible with the infonnation transfer and
decision making needed to pursue the organizational goals.
4. Some of the less desirable properties of this organization are discussed, for a public good
application, in Groves and Ledyard [ 1977).
5 .  Organizations with this property, such as organization 4 in Section 11.B.2 of the text, are generally 
called dominant strategy mechanisms and are considered very desirable since each agent can 
provide his infonnation without concern for others' responses. 
6. Economists will recognize this requires that prices be equal to short- run marginal cost and may
wonder why there are no capacity constraints that must be satisfied. I have, in problem (9),
implicitly assumed that there is a solution.for any R. This requires there to be some collection of 
operating parameters and resources that will allow that R to be supplied, perhaps at a very
expensive cost (e.g., NASA may have been able to fly 120 STS missions per year in 1985, but it
would have had to spend considerably more than it did on ground support, refurbishing,
maintenance, transporting orbiters from coast to coast, etc.). The theory can be easily altered to
allow for capacity constraints in the short-run problem without affecting the basic conclusions. I
do not do that alteration here, but one can consult Banks, Ledyard and Porter [1985a] for some
analysis in this direction.
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7. The careful economist will notice that I have neglected the second order conditions that would rule
out the possibility that we have arrived at a minimum. I do this to simplify the presentation. For
most of this paper, there is no problem as long as the net benefit functions are concave.
8 .  If there are capacity constraints instead of variable short run costs then prices must be set so that 
the aggregate demand of the users fits the available capacity. 
9. This statement may not be immediately obvious to everyone but it is based on the fact that, in this
environment, if D' = D + G solves ( 1 1) then the short-run marginal cost of R for the design D'
'dL • (R ) 'dL (D' ,R ) equals the long-run marginal cost of R .  ( 'dR
= 
'dR ) · 
10. This is why each user's demand must be an insignificant part of the total Station resources.
Otherwise the user can affect prices and incentive compatibility is lost.
1 1 . This is not the place to discuss extensive refonns in the internal decision processes used by NASA 
to allocate resources to science and technology development but anything which 1)  makes payload 
designers and operators more sensitive to the effects of their decisions on net- benefits and 2) 
makes NASA suppliers of resources, such as STS and the Station, more sensitive to the needs of 
the payloads would be a major improvement over the present decision processes. A carefully 
constructed system of internal transfer pricing would be the natural, and perhaps only, way to lead 
designers and operators of the Space Station to create a Station that serves the needs of the users in 
a way that Shuttle has not. 
12. In practice this means that the choices of R and S can depend on the full knowledge of the cost
functions while the choice of D can depend only on the prior beliefs about these costs. In practice,
not all uncertainty about costs may be resolved at the time decisions are made for, say, R .  We
ignore this in our model since there will not be a time to react to the infonnation when it occurs. In
reality, one must consider a sequence of decision days beyond "tomorrow." See Banks et al.
[ 1985b] for one such model.
1 3 .  One can read the paper of Neil Doherty in this volume to understand why (widely held) private 
sector users of Space Station should be thought of as risk-neutral. It follows for similar reasons 
that government financed users should be risk-neutral in their decisionmaking. Since these two 
groups comprise most of the potential users of Space Station, the assumption of risk-neutrality 
seems warranted. 
14. See Marshk and Radner ( 1972] for others. 
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15 .  One way condition (18) would be true i s  if Station operating costs are independent of the level of 
operations; that is, if marginal operating costs are zero. More generally, (18) will be true if 
V(D ,R S w) = V1(D ,R ,S ) + V2(D w )  for then av = avi(D ,S ,R )  and av = avi(D ,S ,R )• · · • aR aR as as 
1 6. Notice that this formulation emphasizes that choices in D determine the effective probability
density on R . That is, choices of design parameters affect reliability.
17 . It  may be confusing to think of H ,  F and D depending on the same random variable. If so, think of
x as a multiple dimensional vector, some of whose components are w .  For example, suppose
x = (w ,w • ) . Then let F and V depend only on w and let H depend only on w * .
18 .  As we know from the STS experience, choices in  operations parameters, such as the number of 
quality control inspectors or tum around times, can affect reliability. Those choices are captured in
this model in D since S is chosen after x occurs and is known. An open research topic concerns
the organizational design problem when some of S must be chosen before x is observed.
19 .  One could also send the simpler function n • (r) = max n (d ,s ,r) .d,s 
20. To be precise we use the integral sign to represent the Riemann- Stieljes integral.
2 1 .  The only difference between this and the process described under operations and manifesting is the 
choice of D according to (23). All else remains the same.
22. One need only consider the language of an insurance policy to realize the problems.
23. Of course, if each party completely trusts the other, then only one need observe and describe the
state of the world. However, economists tend to be somewhat cynical and do not expect much
self-control in the reports from self-interested observers.
24. The pricing rule in (28) is equivalent to P (a.) = L ac· 1aQ (y) . 
yz.a 
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